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ABSTRACT 
What is the problem with targeted killing?  The problem is not simply the legal 
and moral grounds for the policy, nor the tactical implementation of the policy.  Rather, 
the problem is that current research does not convincingly articulate the causal 
relationships of a targeted killing program.  In this thesis, we propose a six-step 
methodology with an embedded robust analytic framework for determining those 
relationships and, ultimately, the effectiveness of targeted killing.  By analyzing Israel’s 
program during the Second Intifada, this thesis demonstrates a causal understanding of 
whether targeted killing is efficacious.  While we ultimately conclude that targeted killing 
was not effective during the Second Intifada, our analysis provides insight into the 
effectiveness of targeted killing—findings that can be used by a state to determine 
whether the costs of targeted killing are worth bearing. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Our original interest in this topic stemmed from the fact that the current 
arguments regarding the efficacy of targeted killing do not address a host of questions 
central to issue.  What effects does a state hope to achieve with targeted killing?  How, 
then, does a state measure the success or failure of targeted killing?  What are the causal 
mechanisms involved in targeted killing?  And if these questions go answered, why 
would a state continue to prosecute such a line of operation without understanding its 
effects or where it fits within a broader counterterrorism strategy? 
We began this thesis with the general premise that Israel’s program of targeted 
killing suffers from a lack of understanding concerning the effects and effectiveness of 
such a program.  The current literature makes claims that are not fully supported.  Critics 
of the program offered evidence that the program is illegal, immoral or ineffective.  
Proponents of the program provide evidence to the contrary.  Ultimately, however, we 
claim that the state of the current literature hinted at the complex and tangled reality of 
targeted killing efficacy—a reality that requires further study. 
Moving forward from the premise of a case not fully made, we introduce a 
methodology for untangling the interrelated nature of the various Israeli lines of operation 
and the environmental factors that impact the levels of Palestinian attacks during the 
Second Intifada.  Our six-step methodological framework—backed by a robust analytic 
process—enables an examination of the effectiveness of Israel’s targeted killing program. 
While our analysis indicates targeted killing seems to be ineffective in this Israeli 
case study, we believe the development and application of our methodological process 
may be more important than simply concluding whether targeted killing is effective or 
not.  At a minimum, we have laid the groundwork of a methodology for actually thinking 
through the problem.  We leave it to future researchers to test our process against other 
cases to determine a more broad applicability of our methodology.  Future tests may 
determine that targeted killing is effective in certain cases.  Therefore, we suggest future 
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applications of such a methodology are critical to both understanding the effects of such a 
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I. CURRENT THOUGHT ON TARGETED KILLING  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Much time and space is given to the myriad criticisms of targeted killing.1  
Opponents challenge the effectiveness of a state’s policy of targeted killing by claiming it 
is immoral, illegal, counterproductive, and flawed.  Certainly, the moral and legal bases 
for targeted killing are very important considerations when arguing for the use of that 
kind of program.  But the claims of efficacy, thus far unsubstantiated by research, serve 
to pose much more problematic roadblocks to the utility of targeted killing.  Addressing 
this argument lays the burden of proof on the proponents of targeted killing to produce 
some measure, some metric, that convincingly demonstrates that targeted killing works.  
Absent this conclusion, we have to question why a state would incur the costs of a 
program that cannot be proven to achieve its desired effects. 
States presumably use targeted killing in an attempt to achieve some set of desired 
effects.  What is fundamentally unclear is just what those desired effects are and why 
targeted killing is the vehicle by which the state has chosen to achieve them.  If we are to 
make the claim that targeted killing is a useful strategy, we need to know why.  At a 
minimum, we need to be able to identify and explain those cause and effect relationships 
that determine whether targeted killing is actually behind the effects being observed.  It 
may very well be the case that targeted killing is the most useful tool in the 
counterterrorism kit.  But the way the current arguments are presented, there are too 
many questions left unanswered to draw this conclusion.  And the conclusions drawn, at 
best, prove only a correlation between targeted killing and some observable effects. 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, we borrow the Israeli term “targeted killing” to refer to a state-sponsored program 
designed to eliminate specific enemy personnel (terrorists, insurgents, combatants, enemy leadership, inter 
alia).  We are not referring to assassination, which is traditionally reserved for those actions directed 
against heads-of-state, and which is illegal under U.S. Executive Order 12333.  In U.S. parlance, targeted 
killing falls under the defined special operations task of direct action (see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint 
Publication 3–05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” Washington, D.C., December 17, 2003, II–4–II–
6, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf (accessed October 31, 2009). 
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B. BACKGROUND 
Several articles addressing Israel’s targeted killing program have been written 
both during and after the Palestinian Second Intifada.2  Additionally, articles concerning 
the use of targeted killing have been published that explore legal, moral, and pragmatic 
concerns.3  This body of work has been carefully crafted to argue either for or against a 
policy of targeted killing.  In some cases, empirical evidence has been compiled to make 
the case that targeted killing is useful, with the same data being used to argue against 
targeted killing.  While simultaneously insightful and confusing, the subject of targeted 
killing has a serious problem that is consistently ignored.  The problem is that the 
strategic question of what utility targeted killing actually provides a state is often left 
unanswered or answered in a way that suggests causality, yet offers only a correlation 
between targeted killings and other events.  Is this confusion necessary?  Can causality be 
determined?  Should targeted killing be used if a state does not know whether or why it 
works? 
Addressing the above questions is difficult given the current available literature.  
This thesis begins with a review of the literature on targeted killing.  Though other 
manuscripts exist, we will examine three particular documents in an attempt to draw 
lessons that may provide a foundation for further research.  The articles are Daniel 
                                                 
2 Though not an exhaustive list, the following articles were also reviewed for unique contributions to 
the discussion: Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Mideast Security and 
Policy Studies No. 51 (2002): 1-26, http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/david.pdf (accessed March 8, 2009); Gal 
Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” The Middle East Quarterly X, 1 (Winter 2003), 
http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels-targeted-killing (accessed March 8, 2009); Michael 
Eisenstadt, “Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings As a Counter-Terror Tool: An Assessment of Israel's 
Approach,” Peacewatch, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 28 August 
2001; Ward Thomas, “The New Age of Assassination,” SAIS Review XXV, 1 (Winter 2005): 27-39, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v025/25.1thomas.pdf (accessed March 8, 2009), among others.  
The papers reviewed suffered from greater or lesser degrees of the privations this thesis argues must be 
corrected in order to know the effects when targeted killing is conducted.  Without this knowledge, targeted 
killing will continue to be misused and misunderstood. 
3 Besides the Cullen article referenced in this thesis, others have made arguments for and against the 
legal and moral legitimacy of such programs, as well as deconstruction of the legal framework for the U.S. 
program.  One example of a far more in-depth review of the legal framework for the U.S. targeted killing 
policy is William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, “Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal 
Framework,” University of Richmond Law Review 37, no. 3 (March 2003): 667-688.  Additionally, Glenn 
Johnson “Mortis Discriminatus: Procedures in Targeted Killing,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 2007 
provides a treatment of legal foundations for operational decision making for U.S. forces who may be 
assigned targeted killing missions. 
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Byman’s “Do Targeted Killings Work?”;4 Peter M. Cullen’s “The Role of Targeted 
Killing in the Campaign Against Terror”;5 and three articles by teams led by Edward H. 
Kaplan from 2005,6 20067 and 2007.8  Each article has strengths and brings important 
issues to the fore.  The intent of this review is to critically examine the thesis of each, 
determine if it provides insight into why targeted killing works or does not work, and 
explore what additional data or analysis may be needed to determine causal factors in the 
efficacy of a program of targeted killing.   
This thesis will argue that these articles, while well thought out and seductively 
argued, do not clearly identify critical elements of analysis—or bury them in other facets 
of analysis—thus missing causal relationships between targeted killing operations and the 
state’s desired strategic goals.  A discussion of a possible alternative methodological 
approach to the problem of causal relationship determination follows the literature 
review.  The thesis concludes with the application of this alternative methodology to 
Israel’s experience with targeted killing during the Second Intifada, with the intent of 
analyzing the effectiveness of the Israeli program of targeted killing.  As part of this 
exploration, our thesis will seek to apply the results of our analysis in order to understand 
what may be necessary to understand the effects of Israel’s targeted killing program. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
Targeted killing operations produce effects that can be analyzed in detail.  The 
results of such an analysis can be used to provide a state with the understanding to make 
informed decisions regarding continued employment of these operations. 
                                                 
4 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 95, 
http://proquest.umi.com (accessed November 10, 2008). 
5 Peter M. Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign Against Terror,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly, 48 (1st Quarter 2008): 22-29, https://nps.blackboard.com (accessed November 8, 2008). 
6 Edward H. Kaplan, et al.., “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?: Insights from a Terror 
Stock Model,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28 (2005): 225–235. 
7 Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, and Shaul Mishal, “Tactical Prevention of Suicide Bombings in 
Israel,” Interfaces 36, no. 6 (November / December 2006): 553–561. 
8 Daniel Jacobson and Edward H. Kaplan, “Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) 
Terror Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution  51, no. 5 (October 2007): 772–792. 
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It is our contention that a robust understanding of the effects of targeted killing is 
possible and that such an understanding provides a state with the discernment to choose 
whether to employ such operations.  We assert that use of the methodological framework 
introduced in this chapter, in tandem with the analytical tools used in Chapters II and III, 
allows for a detailed analysis of the effects of targeted killing and the other lines of 
operation that a state may employ.  The relative impact of each line of operation allows a 
state to understand which line of operations aid attainment of state goals and which do 
not.  Given this understanding, a state can then make rational decisions based on the 
effects of each available line of operation—even if the decision is to assume risk by 
employing operations that may work against stated objectives.9 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Daniel Byman: Targeted Killing Degrades Terrorist Capabilities 
Daniel Byman argues that Israel’s policy of pre-emptive targeted killing is a 
causal factor in the reduction in efficacy of Palestinian terrorist organizations’ suicide 
bombing attacks.10  What’s wrong with this argument?  After all, the author cites 
statistics11 that seemingly prove that after Israel instituted its current program, Palestinian 
groups such as HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were unable to continue to use 
suicide bombing as effectively as during the first intifada or even the first two years of 
the Second Intifada.  If this program is so effective and targeted killing is the causal 
factor in the reduction of Israeli casualties on a per-unit basis, why should the U.S. or 
other states not pursue the same strategy? 
Evaluating Byman’s argument presents some questions: First, what is Israel’s 
strategic goal?  Furthermore, does targeted killing contribute to that goal?  In other 
words, is this targeted killing program effective?  Byman’s argument appears to be that 
Israel simply wants to halt the killing of Israeli citizens by suicide attack.  The targeted 
                                                 
9 We use “lines of operation” throughout this thesis in a non-technical sense—meaning the ways and 
means a state attempts to achieve the desired end state in a given strategy. 
10 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
11 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
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killing program used from the 1970s through the end of the first intifada did not do this 
effectively.  Byman argues that this program was not effective because its pace was 
insufficient to stop effective suicide attacks.12  The targeted killing program used during 
the Second Intifada did work, Byman argues, because targeted killings were sufficiently 
rapid to reduce the number of Israelis killed on a per unit basis.13  This argument is 
seductive because it would have the reader believe that a targeted killing program can 
solve the problems of the state through a relatively simple formula: kill the right bad guys 
fast enough and the strategic problems of the state go away.  The use of statistics makes 
this assertion all the more persuasive.  Yet, one wonders, did Israel do anything else 
during the Second Intifada that also proved useful?  More importantly, what would have 
been the results if the other factors were used without a program of targeted killing?  Did 
targeted killing reduce the number of possible operatives?  Did it solve the long term 
problem that Israel seeks to solve? 
Byman’s analysis does not provide a clear case for establishing targeted killing as 
causal in the reduction of the Palestinian threat to the state of Israel.  This is this case for 
several reasons.  First, Byman does not show detailed analysis that demonstrates a 
temporal-spatial awareness of the several variables involved in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. For example, Byman’s analysis does not convincingly make the case that 
targeted killing and not, for example, the security wall construction that was ongoing 
during the Second Intifada, was causally responsible for the decline in the effectiveness 
of each suicide attack.  Byman instead argues that the security wall was complementary 
to the targeted killing program.  This claim suggests that the targeted killing is sufficient 
and that the wall was an enabling tool.  While this may be true, the article does not 
explore the relationship of these variables.  The article also does not address how arrests 
and targeted killing are interrelated.  Byman cites the Cambridge HAMAS Expert Khaled 
Kroub stating, “On the ground, there is no question that HAMAS has been seriously 
weakened by the decimation of its ranks through assassination [targeted killing] and 
                                                 
12 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
13 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
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arrest.”14  While the fact that HAMAS has been weakened is certainly good news for 
Israel, Byman does not then explore which, arrest or targeted killing, actually caused the 
decimation and which supported it.  No doubt, both had a role to play, but in order to 
apply such a program, a state should understand—at a minimum—the relative effects of 
each strategic operation. 
In the Byman article, no consideration is given to the notion of second- and third-
order effects such as increased recruitment or retaliatory attacks.  As Kaplan et al. have 
asserted, and will be discussed below in more detail, the terror stock model indicates each 
successful Israeli targeted killing operation serves to increase the number of follow-on 
attacks.  Yet, neither Kaplan nor Byman link this relationship to a temporal or spatial 
discussion of how a targeted killing impacts the quality of follow on attacks.  Though 
both authors hint at this relationship, neither adequately addresses this unique 
interdependent relationship among the set of variables.  In other words, even though the 
raw data may suggest targeted killings are effective or not effective based on numbers of 
attacks following an Israeli operation or that, in aggregate, the efficacy of Palestinian 
operations is declining, what is the temporal-spatial relationship of these variables?  Can 
readers draw out conclusions of causality from either Byman or Kaplan?  The arguments 
are both seductive in their use of statistics to legitimize their claims, but fail to guide the 
reader to a strategic conclusion with respect to the utility of such a program.  Simply put, 
both authors leave variables or relationships on the table with varying degrees of neglect. 
To be fair, Byman points out that a number of variables were in play during the 
Second Intifada.  Byman mentions the security wall, improved intelligence networks, 
economic sanctions, and increased rates of arrest.15  While Byman recognizes the need 
for a comprehensive strategy, his argument is ultimately unsatisfying because the reader 
is left to wonder what actually worked to reduce the efficacy of suicide attacks during the 
Palestinian Second Intifada.  Unlike the Kaplan articles discussed below, the use of 
statistics in this article only serve to highlight the weakness of Byman’s ad hoc account 
linking targeted killing with reduced Palestinian effectiveness.  To understand this 
                                                 
14 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
15 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
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relationship, one needs to more clearly understand at least the following points: 1) What 
are the variables at work?  2) What effect does each line of operation have on these 
variables independently? 3) What is the cumulative effect, over time, of varying 
combinations of strategies? 4) Understanding cause and effect independently, what 
effects are produced when an element is removed from the combination?  Byman’s 
article does not adequately provide this understanding. 
2. Peter Cullen: Targeted Killing Works, Even Absent Metrics 
How does Cullen address targeted killing?  Cullen gives an account of the legal, 
moral and pragmatic aspects of targeted killing.16  Though the legal and moral accounts 
are convincing, ultimately, only the utility section of his argument is germane for this 
thesis.  Does Cullen adequately address the causal relationships involved in use of 
targeted killing?  We argue that he does not.  Though Cullen’s paper leans heavily on 
justifications of targeted killing on legal and moral grounds, we argue that such an 
analysis, while useful for justifying the existence of such programs, does little to justify 
the employment of targeted killings.  While a state may have the right to do so, use of 
targeted killing is fundamentally inappropriate if the results do not enable achievement of 
strategic ends. 
So, does Cullen adequately address the efficacy of such a program?  The short 
answer is no.  Cullen harkens back to legal and moral questions in the section devoted to 
arguing for the pragmatic aspects of such a program.17  Tellingly, Cullen makes two 
claims that undermine his claim for targeted killing efficacy.  The first, “There are no 
metrics to measure the effectiveness of targeted killing.”18 This statement ought to be a 
cautionary tale for U.S. policy makers.  If we have no way to know if targeted killing is 
effective, why use it?  Could we not argue that using lines of operation for which there is 
no plausible gauge of efficacy is not only counter-intuitive, but also lends itself to 
application of strategic “wishful thinking” that has caused so much harm to the 
international reputation of the U.S. in  the past? 
                                                 
16 Peter M. Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing,” 22. 
17 Peter M. Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing,” 26. 
18 Peter M. Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing,” 26. 
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Cullen goes on to assert, “More time may be needed before it is possible to 
evaluate the cumulative impact of the policy.  It is clear, however, that targeted killing 
has at least contributed to a cessation of AQAM [al Qaeda Affiliated Movements] attacks 
on U.S. territory.”19  Though true that no additional attacks have been conducted on U.S. 
territory, if Cullen asserts that no metrics exist, how can he then claim that targeted 
killings have contributed to the cessation of attacks on U.S. territory?  This is at best 
unknowable if no metrics exist and at worst misleading—particularly if targeted killing is 
actually making matters worse for other strategies currently being pursued.  For example, 
if a targeted killing operation by one governmental agency actually retards productive 
capture operations by another agency, this seemingly detracts from the overall U.S. 
strategic effort—particularly if Cullen’s assertion is true that no metric currently exists 
for measuring targeted killing efficacy and the cumulative effect of targeted killing 
operations is unknown.20 
On the other hand, these claims are useful if they spark an effort to more carefully 
analyze existing data or spur research to collect new data that can provide the foundation 
for analysis to determine the actual impact of U.S. targeted killings in the U.S. Long War.  
In order to do so, what might we need to know to more fully explain Cullen’s assertions?  
First, we would want data that links the effects of targeted killing to time, space and 
relationships.  This data would allow for informed analysis regarding recruitment and 
follow on attacks.  Second, data is needed that identifies why the individual was targeted.  
This information could presumably provide the basis for an examination of the strategic 
intent and whether this goal was achieved.  Third, given information on the actual target, 
data covering the individual’s place in the terrorist organization’s network would be 
useful.  In utilizing this data, one may better determine what effects targeted killing may 
have on the network—given that individual’s centrality or criticality in the network—
and, when combined with the information on recruiting and follow on attacks, what 
effects may be achieved on the support mechanisms for the network.  Finally, provided 
the above information, a detailed analysis of the impact of targeted killings vis-à-vis U.S. 
                                                 
19 Peter M. Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing,” 26. 
20 Peter M. Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing,” 26. 
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strategic interests could drive discussions to build the measures of effectiveness that 
Cullen notes are currently lacking. 
3. Edward Kaplan, et al.: Targeted Killing Creates More Terrorists 
Turning to the series of articles by Kaplan’s groups provides the reader with a 
highly detailed mathematical model for analyzing the effects of targeted killing over 
time.  When compared to the Byman or Cullen articles, the Kaplan teams’ articles utilize 
a more robust methodology that includes a statement of the problem, a modeling process 
to explain the current reality and a careful analysis of the available data.  While Kaplan’s 
modeling can be difficult for many readers, the major themes are revealing and deserve 
careful consideration as the models appear to reveal some surprising insights.  The 2005 
Kaplan piece provides a modeling of the concept of terror-stock modeling that concludes 
that arrests result in greater utility for Israel in reducing the terror stock when compared 
to targeted killing.21  The 2006 article builds on this model while analyzing the data using 
shot-noise techniques that result in conclusions similar to the 2005 article.22  Finally, the 
2007 article builds on these models to produce a game theory approach to the Levant 
problem that concludes that an optimal approach (depending on desired strategic 
outcomes) can be derived through game theory in n-period games.23  This thesis does not 
address all three articles and will focus on the 2005 article, as it provides similar 
conclusions to the 2006 article, while providing the foundation for a mathematical 
approach to analyzing the data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The major premise in Kaplan’s article is that successful Israeli targeted killing 
operations result in a marked increase in recruitment for Palestinian terrorist 
organizations while arrests have been more successful in reducing attacks and 
recruitment.24  The authors’ analysis indicated that the effects of collateral damage were 
actually helpful to the Israeli cause—though the cause of this phenomenon is still 
                                                 
21 Edward H. Kaplan, et al.., “What Happened?” 225–235. 
22 Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, and Shaul Mishal, “Tactical Prevention of Suicide Bombings,” 
553–561. 
23 Daniel Jacobson and Edward H. Kaplan, “Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings,” 772–792. 
24 Edward H. Kaplan, et al., “What Happened?” 225. 
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unclear.25  Does this argument suggest that targeted killing, vice “targeted” arrests, 
should cease?  It appears to.  Yet, does this argument also convincingly prove causality?  
We argue that it does not. 
The authors arrive at their conclusion through very detailed analysis, yet when 
reviewing the foundation of their argument readers may notice an assumption that may 
inhibit the ultimate utility of their argument.  Kaplan claims there is no way to quantify 
the terror-stock size.26  This is a curious baseline given the mathematical formula implies 
recruitment as a function of the size of the terror-stock model from the previous day.  The 
modeling results suggest a spike in recruitment following a successful targeted killing 
operation.27  Additionally, the expected rate of suicide attacks is also modeled using the 
size of the terror stock.  Again, not knowing the size of the terror stock appears to cast 
doubts on the model’s ability to adequately understand causal relationships.  For 
example, retaliatory suicide bombings may have actually been latent capacity within the 
terrorist organization that is unleashed in response to other factors—the targeted killing 
might be time coincident and not causal.  Even if one assumes the model perfectly fits the 
data (that, not coincidentally, it does), the reader is left with the impression that the only 
variables involved in recruitment of terrorists are the interplay of suicide bombing attacks 
and Israeli efforts to either kill or capture these bombers.  Is this always the case? 
While any mathematical model, to be useful, must seek to simplify reality by 
making assumptions, the reader must be careful to critically evaluate the context during 
the period covered by the model.  In this case, the early years (2000 through 2003) of the 
Second Intifada serve as this context.  During these years, Israel employed a more 
concerted and aggressive capture or kill strategy than employed during the first intifada.  
At the same time, Israel also adjusted its overall strategy to include the construction of 
the Anti-Terrorist Fence28 and increased the use of sanctions.  The reader may wonder 
                                                 
25 Edward H. Kaplan, et al., “What Happened?” 230. 
26 Edward H. Kaplan, et al., “What Happened?” 226. 
27 Edward H. Kaplan, et al., “What Happened?” 230. 
28 Israel’s Anti-Terrorist Fence is referred to by a host of names to include: barrier, wall, security 
fence, separation fence, inter alia.  Throughout this thesis we use the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
nomenclature, “Anti-Terrorist Fence” (or in some cases, just “Fence”). 
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whether the Kaplan analysis does not suffer a bit from a post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy.  The rise in recruitment following a successful targeted killing may not be driven 
by reaction to the targeted killing—either primarily or at all.  This distinction is not mere 
semantics.  The allure of the Israeli targeted killing model vis-à-vis the U.S. Long War is 
that such a program appears to leaders to be a high payoff tactic that eliminates 
dangerous terrorists while simultaneously limiting exposure of U.S. forces.  Could 
Kaplan’s terror-stock modeling drive us to abandon targeted killing?  It could.  Would 
this be a strategic mistake?  Possibly—yet Kaplan’s thesis at least reinforces that strategic 
calculations must address whether such a program is counterproductive.  Nevertheless, 
though the Kaplan model has a near perfect fit for the data, the reader is left with the 
sense that the model was constructed to fit the data and the causal relationship for the 
recruitment results may be hidden by the answer the model provides. 
E. AN ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY 
As has been argued in the above paragraphs, a methodology for effectively 
gauging the utility of targeted killing does not exist.  A review of the literature seems to 
indicate that we cannot understand what singular factor or combination of factors actually 
facilitates or drives success in a counterterrorism strategy—especially as it pertains to 
targeted killing.  Is targeted killing an effective use of a state’s blood and treasure?  If so, 
how effective is it, and how do we know?  If targeted killing is ineffective, why and, 
again, how do we know?  The authors referenced in this thesis have made contributions 
to the discussion and understanding of targeted killing, but in all instances, do not make 
compelling cases for the continued use of such a strategy.  If it is truly the case that we do 
not have enough information to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of targeted killing, 
then a methodology to better explore the issue needs to be developed.  A thorough 
discussion of this topic requires a treatment of a number of questions that, to date, remain 
unanswered—or at least unclear. 
The answer to the question of the efficacy of targeted killing rests in an 
understanding of the desired effects of such a program coupled with whether the program 
actually helps a state achieve those effects.  Determining the desired and actual effects of 
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targeted killing, and then discovering the delta between those two sets of effects, we 
contend, is an involved process and sets the stage for a discussion of our proposed six-
step methodology for determining the utility of targeted killing. 
1. Define the Strategy 
The first step of this methodology asks the following question: What is the state’s 
strategy vis-à-vis its targeted killing program, i.e., what are the desired effects the state is 
trying to achieve via targeted killing?  While the methodology we will lay out is meant to 
determine the causal relationships involved in targeted killing, in the greater discussion of 
the utility of targeted killing, we have to know whether that program is achieving the 
effects the state intends for it to achieve.  In order to answer this question, we have to 
know why the state is embarking on a program of targeted killing in the first place. 
Is targeted killing meant to achieve enemy attrition, enemy paralysis, both, 
neither?  Is the state using targeted killing to eliminate terrorists, pacify populaces, 
degrade networks, halt movements, earn political clout?  Understanding that there can be 
a mix of tactical, operational, and strategic desired effects, and further recognizing that 
for any given category of effect there will be myriad questions that arise, simply knowing 
what those effects are is necessary to understand targeted killing’s efficacy. 
2. Define the Problem 
The problem this methodology attempts to address is the following: What are the 
actual effects of targeted killing?  What really happens when a state undertakes a program 
of targeted killing?  A large part of the criticisms of targeted killing is that the follow-on 
effects of such a program (beyond dead terrorists) are deleterious to a state’s overall 
strategy.  Thus, we ask, what are those follow-on effects?  Determining targeted killing’s 
effectiveness rests on our ability to determine whether targeted killing is achieving the 
state’s desired effects or whether targeted killing is detracting from those desired 
effects—in this case reducing or eliminating Palestinian attacks.  This is not a simple a 
cost-benefit analysis of weighing the benefit of dead terrorists against the cost of inciting 
local populations (although these considerations are involved in this kind of calculus).  
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Rather, there are a host of variables at play that require thorough analysis to sufficiently 
untangle the causal process(es) involved. 
3. Identify and Operationalize the Variables 
Any counterterrorism strategy involves a number of independent variables—that 
is, the lines of operation a state may pursue to achieve its desired end state.   In this 
thesis, we initially limit our study of independent variables to those that can be observed 
via temporal and spatial analysis.  The initial independent variables analyzed are the 
following: episodes of targeted killing, detentions of Palestinians by Israel, and the use of 
barriers to movement—specifically, Israel’s construction of the Anti-Terrorist Fence 
around the West Bank.  We recognize, however, this restriction to directly observable 
variables may ignore instruments of national power such as economic sanctions and 
diplomatic efforts, the results of which are not easily quantifiable given the current data.  
As our analysis builds throughout this thesis, we will examine some of these types of 
variables in an attempt to better understand the utility of targeted killing. 
Targeted killing never occurs in a vacuum.  There are always other factors that 
may contribute to the observable effects.  As noted above, Byman lays out some of the 
variables Israel has manipulated during its counterterrorism effort in the Second 
Intifada.29  Targeted killing was but one of those variables.  Any number of independent 
variables may exist; lines of operation undertaken in a larger counterterrorism context.   
Employment of the independent variables causes some degree of variation in the 
dependent variable, that, in this thesis, is the attainment of Israel’s strategic desired end 
state.  We will define and discuss this end state in the next chapter.  To that end, our case 
study will analyze the effectiveness of targeted killing in achieving the state objective. 
Assessing the independent variables requires holding one of the independent 
variables constant while allowing others to vary.  For example, observing the amount of 
targeted killing variation while holding other independent variables constant, such as rate 
of arrests or implementing barriers to movement, allows for a careful analysis of the 
                                                 
29 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
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impact of targeted killing.  Likewise, holding the targeted killing variable constant while 
observing variance in another tactic, such as arrests, allows for analysis of the efficacy of 
other lines of operation.  The dependent variable studied is then observed for the rate of 
change.  This analytic methodology allows for a study of the efficacy of each line of 
operation by analyzing the co-variation of the dependent variable as each independent 
variable is employed to varying degrees. 
4. Collecting the Data   
The next step in this methodology is to ask if the types of data articulated in Step 
3 exist.30  Perhaps so.  Some of the data offered in the referenced literature is pertinent, 
but incomplete.  Perhaps some degree of primary research is still required to be able to 
provide the level of detail necessary.  Regardless, the data required to study the effects of 
the independent variables on the attainment of state policy objective is necessary to 
derive the utility of targeted killing.  Data such as number of Palestinian attacks after 
Israeli implementation a program of targeted killing vice after implementation of the 
Anti-Terrorist Fence are germane to this analysis. 
Furthermore, this data should be studied in the context of time and space.  For 
example, does an episode of targeted killing cause a decrease in the number of Israelis 
killed by terrorist attacks in the surrounding area?  If the data suggests that targeted 
killing does cause this reduction, how long does this reduction last?  If the data does not 
support such claims, we may simply be observing a correlation of events, not whether 
one causes the other.  Having a full spectrum of reliable data underlying the causal 
relationships is a must.  Key elements of the data we are endeavoring to collect are the 
temporal and spatial pieces of information that can help determine the causality outlined 
in Step 5.  We have to know when and where these data are occurring, specifically in 
relation to one another, if we are to be able to draw any meaningful conclusions as to 
their relationships. 
                                                 
30 We chose the Israeli case because of the richness of the available data and the resultant opportunity 
to conduct the kinds of analysis necessary to determine the causal relationships involved in targeted killing.  
For a state considering this line of operation in future, consideration should be given to the data pertinent to 
that state’s particular situation. 
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Included in this discussion is the set of questions that explores the temporal nature 
of the effects of targeted killing.  Are the effects of targeted killing seen immediately, or 
is there an element of latency associated with certain observations?  We propose 
investigating a temporal breakpoint, based on the data analysis, after which the effects of 
targeted killing may no longer be attributed to that program.  Similarly, we will use the 
data analysis to determine if a spatial relationship exists—that is, based on the relative 
proximity of an instance of targeted killing and observed effects, does distance matter?  
For example, if an episode of targeted killing produces a decline in Palestinian attacks, 
does this effect apply only to a certain area surrounding the incident of targeted killing? 
The point of this discussion is to understand that the process of determining the 
effectiveness of targeted killing is a bit more involved than some of the existing literature 
suggests.  Knowing what data is required to understand the relationships is obviously 
crucial.  Some of the data offered in the referenced literature is pertinent, but incomplete.  
Simply treating a portion of the problem will not lead to a full understanding of the 
factors at play; that will lead to the inability to draw meaningful conclusions on the 
effects—and ultimate utility—of targeted killing. 
5. Determining Causal Relationships 
As has been noted earlier, previous authors have been incomplete in their analyses 
of the causal relationships of targeted killing.  Arguably, the principal shortfall of the 
literature on this topic centers on the other independent variables employed in addition to, 
or in concert with targeted killing.  A key set of questions is: What else is going on?  
What are the other lines of operation in play?  What effects are they achieving, and how 
do we know?  What is the enemy doing during the same time period?  What effects are 
those actions achieving, and how do we know?  Central to this line of questioning is the 
notion that it is extremely difficult—yet methodologically crucial—to differentiate 
between the effects of targeted killing and the effects of other actions. 
In this thesis, we propose to iteratively build analyses from simple correlative 
observations to a more robust statistical framework.  A within-case linkage of specific 
Israeli lines of operation with the observed outcomes hinges on an ability to isolate the 
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effects of each line of operation.  Isolating the impacts of each independent variable on 
the dependent variable is possible if the data are analyzed using multivariate analytic 
tools.  These results can then be classified by the degree to which each line of operation 
assisted the attainment of strategic desired end state.  We will review the other lines of 
operation employed in the area and at the time of the targeted killing.  By analyzing the 
interrelated nature of the relationships among these data points, we intend to gain a more 
thorough understanding of which line of operation was attributable to the effects 
observed. 
6. Determine Applicability 
As a final step in our proposed methodology, we broach the subject of the 
applicability of our findings.  Based on the case study data analysis described above, we 
expect to derive causal relationships between the use of a program of targeted killing and 
the efficacy of Israel’s program.  We argue this expected utility must be couched in terms 
of the dependent variable—that is, the state’s strategic desired end state.  By knowing the 
effects of targeted killing, strategic leadership may be better prepared to assume the 
potential risks of targeted killing couched in terms of potential benefits of such 
operations. 
This study is designed to allow for future analysis of novel cases in order for a 
state to determine whether a program of targeted killing may be efficacious given a set of 
antecedent conditions relative to a stated strategic desired end state.  We would offer that 
history contains numerous datasets with which to test our methodological procedure.  
Additionally, contemporary U.S. cases seem particularly appropriate venues for an in-
depth analysis of the efficacy of targeted killing.31  In other words, are the theaters in 
which the U.S. is conducting similar operations (Iraq, Afghanistan, Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, Horn of Africa, inter alia) so different, so idiosyncratic from 
one another that the above methodology would only be applicable to a specific theater or 
                                                 
31 The British experience in Malaya and Northern Ireland, the French experience in Algeria, the U.S.’s 
Phoenix Program in Vietnam and contemporary U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan—to name but a 
few—could prove to be potentially useful case studies to further this research. 
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locus?  Or, is there a larger set of lessons learned that can be extracted from one theater 
and then applied to others? 
F. THESIS PREVIEW AND ROADMAP 
In this introductory chapter, we have outlined the essential problems with the 
current state of play in the targeted killing arena.  As evidenced in the literature review, 
the core problem with the employment of targeted killing is that a state does not know 
what effect is achieved or if the use of targeted killing is producing the desired effect.  
Our hypothesis is that the effects of targeted killing operations can be known and these 
effects can be analyzed along with other lines of operation in order to discern which lines 
of operation are “working” and which are not.  From this understanding, a state may then 
choose which lines of operation to employ and which to curtail.  Alternatively, a state can 
determine when and where to accept risks by employing targeted killing.  Following this 
statement of the problem and research hypothesis, we introduced an alternative 
methodology for analyzing the variables operative in a state’s counterterrorism campaign 
employing targeted killing as one line of operation. 
In the chapters that follow, we will examine the Israeli experience with targeted 
killing during the Second Intifada using the methodology introduced above.  From a 
careful analysis of the independent and dependent variables, a better understanding of the 
effects of targeted killing—along with the other lines of operations operative in this 
case—will be used to empirically determine the efficacy of targeted killing. 
Chapter II introduces the Israeli case study, beginning with a brief background of 
the Second Intifada and Israel’s counterterrorism experience.  From there we will 
articulate Israel’s strategic desired end state vis-à-vis its targeted killing program.  
Inherent in this discussion is the Israeli process for selection of targets and why targeted 
killing is chosen in these cases.  Throughout this chapter, we begin to build the analytical 
framework linking empirical outcomes of Israel’s lines of operation to their respective 
contribution to stated policy goals.32 
                                                 
32 Chapter II contains application of elements of Steps 1–5 of our proposed methodology. 
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Chapter III represents an iterative approach to analyzing the baseline variables 
discussed above, as well as drawing out additional variables from our extensive research 
of the case study.  These additional variables help drive an understanding of which lines 
of operation reduce or increase Palestinian attacks against Israel.  Additionally, Chapter 
III introduces vignettes that serve to explore the qualitative conditions ongoing during the 
Second Intifada.  These vignettes provide some richness to the quantitative analysis in 
order to capture those actions that may be difficult to quantify, yet we suspect impact the 
conflict.  We conclude Chapter III with a brief discussion of the analytic findings as well 
as their implications for future conflicts.33 
Chapter IV is our discussion of possible policy implications.  Key to this 
discussion is transitioning from targeted killing’s tactical outcomes to strategic-level 
considerations for use of such a program.  We conclude with a review of the lessons 
learned from the Israeli case and generalize these lessons to other, and perhaps novel, 
cases.  Though the scope of this thesis is insufficient to cover all details of a national 
level policy, we aim to provide a framework in which to consider the implementation of a 
program of targeted killing—that is, given the observed effects in a theater of operation, 
is the use of targeted killing a good option for a state, or will such a program work to its 
disadvantage.34  
                                                 
33 Chapter III fully develops and implements Step 5 of our proposed methodology, but also contains 
some discussion of Step 4. 
34 Chapter IV couches our analytic findings in terms of Step 6 of our proposed methodology, 
providing a useable framework for our empirical results. 
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II. THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE WITH TARGETED KILLING 
DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND INTIFADA 
The seeds of the Second Intifada were planted in 1965.  While this year certainly 
was not the beginning of the Jewish experience with Palestinian violence,35 al-Fatah’s 
January 1965 attack in Galilee marked the beginning of the link between Palestinian acts 
of violence and achievement of Palestinian national goals, especially “‘liberating 
Palestine’ and establishing a Palestinian state, which would replace the State of Israel.”36  
The years following Fatah’s 1965 attack saw a host of violent lines of operation 
prosecuted by Palestinians, as well as various Israeli countermeasures.37  After the Six 
Day War (1967) and in the years leading up to the First Intifada in December 1987, 
Palestinian small-scale violence against Israel escalated, transnational-regional 
involvement with the Palestinian cause increased,38 and Israel continued to respond to 
aggression from within and without its borders.  Ceasefires were agreed to and broken, 
various militant Arab groups surfaced and faded away, and more conventional wars were 
fought between Israel and her neighbors.  Israel’s military and diplomatic successes and 
failures, often embodied in the cyclical Arab-Israeli peace process, coupled with 
recurring Palestinian leadership and population issues, paved a tumultuous road toward 
the events of the Second Intifada. 
                                                 
35 Understanding that the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 saw the first “round” of fighting between the 
newly-formed State of Israeli and its Arab neighbors, and that Arab violence against Jews can be traced all 
the way back to the time of British-mandated Palestine and the period immediately following the 1917 
Balfour Declaration, we make the 1965 distinction as it seems to introduce Palestinian goals that transcend 
the simple destruction of Israel.  This idea is borrowed from Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian 
Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1980), vii. 
36 Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism, 7. 
37 For the Palestinians, lines of operation include bombings, suicide attacks, hijackings, assassinations, 
inter alia.  For Israel, lines of operation included the reintroduction of defensive measures; e.g., fences and 
guards around settlements, as well as offensive operations against neighboring countries.  See, for example, 
Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism. 
38 Here we simply recognize that after the Israeli victory against its Arab neighbors in June 1967, there 
was a sense that “pan-Arab” support for the Palestinian cause was warranted.  Egypt and Jordan joined 
Syria and Lebanon in adopting a strategy of terrorism against Israel.  See Hanan Alon, Countering 
Palestinian Terrorism, 41. 
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The failure of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to broker peace with PLO 
Chairman Yasir Arafat during the Camp David peace talks in July 2000 ushered in the 
hard-line leadership of the Likud party in subsequent Israeli elections,39 putting in place 
antecedent conditions that set ablaze the second uprising of Palestinian militant groups in 
Israel and Israeli-occupied territories.40  The Second Intifada, commonly referred to as 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada, is widely thought to have begun on September 28, 2000, when then 
head of the Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.  While the 
Temple Mount is the holiest site in Judaism, it is also the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the 
third holiest site in Islam.41  Although Sharon did not enter the mosque, his visit incited 
Palestinian protests provoking a harsh Israeli response that injured hundreds of 
Palestinians in ensuing riots.42  In fact, Israel claims the Palestinian Authority began 
planning the Second Intifada immediately after the failed Camp David peace talks, and 
that Sharon’s visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque was merely an excuse to begin hostilities.43  
During the subsequent demonstrations, Palestinians rallied around the accidental death of 
a 12-year-old Gazan caught in Israeli and Palestinian cross fire, while Israelis were 
incensed by the lynching of two Israeli Defense Force (IDF) reservists in Ramallah who 
                                                 
39 We recognize that the 2000 round of talks at Camp David were less a failure of Barak’s ability to 
broker peace, and more a success of Arafat in purposefully forestalling any hope of meaningful 
reconciliation.  Regardless, the resultant political landscape in Israel was such that the Likud Party became 
very well-positioned to capture power in the Israeli Parliament; cap-stoned with the election of Sharon as 
prime minister on February 6, 2001. 
40 Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, (Burlington, VT: 




m=2#v=onepage&q=&f=false (accessed August 8, 2009). 
41 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd ed., 
rev. and updated (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 46-49.  The significance of one 
geographic location is suggestive of the intractable nature of the conflict with both sides claiming an 
inerrant right and legitimacy of occupation. 
42 GlobalSecurity.org, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/intifada2.htm (accessed August 6, 2009). 
43 GlobalSecurity.org, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 
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had taken refuge in a police station.44  From this incident, the scope and scale of the 
Second Intifada continued to escalate unchecked. 
The years between the beginning of the Second Intifada and 2004 saw the highest 
levels of violence of the Second Intifada,45 and brought about the use of suicide 
bombings by Palestinian groups, as well as Israel’s use of surgical targeted killing 
(among other counterterrorism lines of operation).  The introduction of the “Roadmap for 
Peace” in June 2003,46 and the death of Arafat in November 2004, renewed hopes for 
peace.  And when newly-elected PA President Mahmoud Abbas met with Israeli Prime 
Minister Sharon in February 2005, both sides agreed to a mutual cease fire.  Some argue 
that this event marked the end of the Second Intifada, but in July 2005, a Palestinian 
suicide bomber reignited hostilities in the central Israeli town of Netanya.  In January 
2006, HAMAS defied the West by democratically taking control of the PA Legislature,47 
and later that summer, Israel became embroiled in another conflict in Lebanon, ushering 
in a relative period of calm in the Second Intifada.  Regardless, it is generally accepted 
that the Second Intifada still continues today, with each side maneuvering not only for the 
political will of their respective populations, but also for the support of the global 
community.48  
The failure of past and present negotiation efforts between Israel and Palestine is 
symptomatic of the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian issue.  Several initiatives have 
been attempted by different world leaders since before and during the Second Intifada, 
but all have failed.  The Israeli government answers to a constituency that wants a 
                                                 
44 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed., (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2007), 330–332. 
45 Throughout this thesis, we rely primarily on B’Tselem’s complied statistics.  While some 
limitations exist in these datasets (e.g., the absence of non-fatal casualties), and while we have augmented 
these datasets as indicated, the richness and reliability of B’Tselem’s data is recognized in the literature.  
See B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Statistics,” 
http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Index.asp (accessed November 11, 2008). 
46 The United Nations News Centre, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,”  http://www.un.org/media/main/roadmap122002.pdf  (accessed 
September 3, 2009). 
47 GlobalSecurity.org, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 
48 For a timeline of the major events related to the Second Intifada see, for example, Ian J. Bickerton 
and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
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brokered peace, but sees no evidence of an end to the violence.  The Palestinians have 
several groups pursuing their own agendas within the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
Although most Palestinians have grown weary of the constant state of war, several 
Palestinian groups feel compelled to pursue the goal of a Palestinian state on current 
Israeli territory.  Further adding to the complexity of this issue is the phenomenon that 
within the Israeli and Palestinian camps are groups with very different views on exactly 
what means should be used to achieve which ends, not to mention both Israel and the PA 
have extremist constituents who work to prevent peace efforts from succeeding.  This is 
by no means a conflict between two otherwise homogenous sides.  For the Palestinians, 
the lack of an overall functioning representative governing structure only increases the 
turbulence caused by the rising and falling of levels of nationalism.49  While more muted 
within Israeli’s functioning democracy, the Jewish state is not immune to winds of 
political change dictating the direction of Israel’s counterterrorism strategy. 
 Since 2000, the Second Intifada has claimed the lives of over 1,000 Israeli 
citizens and over 9,400 Palestinians.  Additionally, Israel has detained thousands of 
Palestinians, built a security fence around much of the West Bank, effectively cut off the 
Gaza Strip from the rest of the world, and used various diplomatic, economic, and 
humanitarian pressures in an attempt to secure its citizenry from Palestinian attacks.  
Despite all of this, the Second Intifada is still ongoing.  We conclude this section with the 
question: what is Israel’s desired end state vis-à-vis the Second Intifada, and how does it 
gauge success and failure in that endeavor? 
B. ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIC DESIRED END STATE 
The basic foundation of any campaign is the strategic desired end state to which 
operational and tactical actions must build.50  For our argument, the strategic desired end 
state is the goal for which the state is striving.  In other words, if a state does not know 
the end toward which it is working, how can that state begin to build a campaign to get to 
                                                 
49 It is not lost on the authors that a major contributor to the lack of cohesive Palestinian governance is 
the intra-Palestinian conflict—a fact that will be explored in later chapters. 
50 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 579. 
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that end?  In the case of the Israeli counterterrorism campaign, the strategic desired end 
state appears to be a prevention of future attacks on Israel and her citizens.51  Clouding 
the issue of desired end state is the internal security decision making processes within the 
Israeli government.  As the former Deputy National Security Advisor has detailed, the 
Israeli government operates with a very short time horizon measured in days and weeks 
vice years or generations.  This lack of long-term outlook, coupled with the nature of 
coalition governance, has produced a startling lack of strategy for the counterterrorism 
campaign.  The Israeli national security decision-making process appears to have no 
strategic vision or framework, is ad hoc in the extreme, and appears to have very little 
empirical or analytic basis for the purposes of measuring effectiveness.  Additionally, 
what little strategic vision that does come from the government is dependent upon the 
leadership of a particular prime minister, the coalition and cabinet formed, and tends to 
change with each election.  Finally, the lack of long-term policy making and strategic 
planning in Israel has much to do with Israel’s history as a nation and its perception of 
the unique and extreme threat environment in which Israel exists.52  Ultimately, the 
importance of the strategic desired end state, in the context of our thesis, is to define the 
dependent variable of our analysis. 
Given this strategic desired end state, what, then, is Israel doing to prevent future 
Palestinian attacks?  During the Second Intifada, Israel has employed arrest, barriers to 
movement, occupation, military incursions into Palestinian refugee camps, targeted 
killings and the recently constructed Anti-Terrorist Fence between the West Bank and 
                                                 
51 While some authors present a different strategic desired end state, the Israeli government has been 
somewhat silent on this issue.  The Israeli Supreme Court addressed this issue early in their denial of the 
petition of the Public Committee Against Torture v. Government in December in 2006.  In the synopsis of 
the case, the Supreme Court puts the state position on targeted killings as a pre-emptive strike to prevent 
attacks.  See The Supreme Court of Israel, “Targeted Killings: Public Committee Against Torture v. 
Government,” in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism Within the Law 3 (Jerusalem: 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009), 85.  The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs also points to reduction 
in attack levels as the measure of effectiveness for this campaign.  See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“Saving Lives: Israel’s anti-terrorist fence – Answers to Questions,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/11/Saving+Lives-+Israel-s+anti-
terrorist+fence+-+Answ.htm (accessed March 8, 2009).  Specifically, “The anti-terrorist fence: facts and 
figures (powerpoint)” provides measures tracking the decline of Palestinian attacks as sections of the Anti-
Terrorist Fence are built. 
52 Charles D. Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies and 
Strengths,” The Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 635–663. 
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Israel proper; to say nothing of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure.53  Though 
this list is not exhaustive, it represents the lengths to which Israel has gone to realize the 
strategic desired end state: prevention of future terror attacks.  Each of these lines of 
operation has benefits and costs associated with its conduct.  Additionally, not all are as 
benign or as malicious as they may appear on the surface.  For example, while the Anti-
Terrorist Fence may appear to be a relatively benign form of population control—
arguably less invasive than other forms of barriers to movement Israel has used—this line 
of operation has not been without its critics.54  Some of these critics point out that the 
Fence is effectively another form of collective punishment; roughly akin to the major 
incursions into the Occupied Territories that also brought a resounding chorus of 
criticism to the Israeli government at other times during the Second Intifada.55  In a 
similar vein, while the program of targeted killing appears, to many observers, to be the 
height of malicious and violent action, others have noted that this may have a more 
benign impact on the Palestinian population than other forms of Israeli counterterrorism 
action.56  Yet, even if Israel could make an operational choice that would only gain the 
support of critics, the issue at hand remains the effectiveness of targeted killing. 
The problem with analyzing any one of these lines of operation is that none of 
them occur in a vacuum.  For example, while targeted killing operations have been 
utilized since November 2000,57 and continued well into 2006, beginning in 2002 and 
                                                 
53 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 95. 
54 See, for example, the UN International Court of Justice ruling on the legality of the “separation 
barrier” (United Nations, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Request for advisory opinion),” International Court of Justice, July 9, 2004, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf (accessed August 11, 2009)).  Additionally, B’Tselem has highlighted 
negative aspects of the Anti-Terrorist Fence to include issues of sovereignty and re-occupation of 
Palestinian territory (B’Tselem: The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 
“Separation Barrier,” http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/ (accessed March 8, 2009)). 
55 Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices,” 19–20. 
56 Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices,” 19. 
57 Yael Stein, “Position Paper: Israeli’s Assassination Policy: Extra-Judicial Executions,” translated by 
Maya Johnston , B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 
January, 2001, 1, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/btselem_extrajudicial_killi.pdf (accessed March 6, 
2009). 
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continuing through 2008, the Anti-Terrorist Fence was being constructed.58  This 
construction may have served to reduce the overall number of attacks originating from 
the West Bank, but it also clouds the issue of causality—namely, if the number of attacks 
(or even the lethality of attacks) is reduced, did the reduction occur as a result of the 
security fence, arrests, targeted killing, or all three?  Did something else—e.g., peace 
negotiations or changing Israeli state interests—contribute to the decline?  The answer to 
the question of causality is difficult, but by isolating the targeted killing variable, we seek 
to understand its effects by observing variation of outcomes and by observing the 
intervening variables that occur in the course of any operation. 
The Israeli decision to pursue targeted killing operations in earnest during the 
Second Intifada has produced international criticism over the methods used to interdict 
potential terrorists.  While we will not delve into the legal aspects of targeted killing, it is 
worth noting that the targeted killing program has been challenged before the Israeli 
Supreme Court on numerous occasions and has been upheld each time.59  Though the 
Israeli Supreme Court is not a completely objective arbiter of the legality of this program, 
one can argue that the program, at a minimum, is consistent with the legal norms within 
the construct of the democratic Israeli legal system.  Additionally, as a result of the 
ongoing challenges from various human rights organizations regarding Israeli targeted 
killing operations, the IDF has issued basic guidance on the manner in which a target 
moves through the various stages of the program.60  The Israeli government decides 
whether to employ targeted killing for a number of reasons.  We argue that this decision 
should be based on an analysis of the existing data using the framework and tools we 
discuss in this thesis. 
                                                 
58 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives – Israel’s Security Fence,” November 26, 2003, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Saving+Lives-
+Israel-s+Security+Fence.htm (accessed March 8, 2009). 
59 The Supreme Court of Israel, “Targeted Killings.” 
60 For a review of the process, see for example, Amos Harel and Gideon Alon, “IDF lawyers set 
'conditions' for assassination policy,” Haaretz.com, April 2, 2002, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=125404 (accessed October 2, 2009). 
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C. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF TARGETED KILLING EFFECTS 
Building on the previous section’s discussion of Israel’s strategic desired end 
state, we propose to begin building a more satisfying evaluation of whether Israel’s 
targeted killing program contributes to the attainment of the Israeli strategic desired end 
state (preventing Palestinian attacks).  As part of this analysis, we strive to unpack to 
what degree targeted killing contributes to the attainment of success when other factors 
are considered, such as the construction of the Anti-Terrorist Fence and Palestinians 
detentions.  In order to accomplish this task, we begin by analyzing whether a 
relationship exists between instances of targeted killing and a reduction in Palestinian 
violence. 
1. Simple Scatter Plot Analysis 
In Figure 1, we test the theory that the increased instances of targeted killings 
have contributed to the reduction in Palestinian violence.  The figure depicts the 
relationship between the dependent variable (instances of Palestinian attacks) on the y-
axis and the independent variable (instances of Israeli targeted killing operations) along 
the x-axis.  If the assertion that increased rate of targeted killing contributes to a reduction 
in terror attacks, the expected slope of the scatter plot band would be negative—that is, 
the direction of the band of observations of Palestinian attacks would become lower on 
the y-axis as the observations along the x-axis increased.  As shown in Figure 1, this is 
not the case.  In fact, the opposite relationship is indicated: as targeted killings increase, 
so do terrorist attacks.  In this analysis, we have not accounted for time or other factors.  
At a minimum, we have shown that there is a positive correlation between targeted 
killing and Palestinian attack levels. 
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Figure 1.   Annualized Scatter Plot of Targeted Killings versus Palestinian Attacks.61 
Though the relationship is not what was expected, we suspect that the simplistic 
depiction of the data is revealing something about the nature of the interrelationship 
between Palestinian attacks and instances of targeted killing.  Recall from the preceding 
section that the Israeli targeted killing program is to be used in a preventative or pre-
emptive manner.  In the case of the Second Intifada, the program was to be used to 
interdict individuals either en route a terrorist attack or in the final stages of planning an 
imminent attack. 
As illustrations of the kind of relationship we expect to see with these simple 
scatter plots, we have included Figures 2 and 3.  Each graph depicts the relationship 
between the dependent variable (instances of Palestinian attacks) on the y-axis and 
another independent variable (Figure 2: kilometers of Anti-Terrorist Fence completed; 
Figure 3: number of Palestinians detained by Israel) along the x-axis. 
 
 
                                                 
61 For the purposes of our analysis we include the B’Tselem data on Palestinian attacks and Israeli 
targeted killing from October 1, 2000 through December 31, 2008.  See B’Tselem: The Israeli Information 
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Statistics: Fatalities,” 






Figure 2.   Annualized Scatter Plot of Kilometers of Anti-Terrorist Fence versus Palestinian 
Attacks.62 
 
                                                 
62 For this scatter plot, the data range is from the beginning of B’Tselem’s Second Intifada data 
through August 31, 2008 only.  We again include the B’Tselem data on Palestinian attacks (see B’Tselem, 
“Statistics: Fatalities”) and use Anti-Terrorist Wall completion data from a combination of B’Tselem 
(B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Separation 
Barrier: Statistics,” http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp (accessed November 
11, 2009)), UNOCHA (United Nations, “Barrier Gates Open to Palestinians,” Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Relief and Works Agency, July 2008, 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/BarrierRouteProjections_July_2008.pdf (accessed October 1, 2009)), 
and Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs  and Defense (see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel 
Diplomatic Network: The Anti-Terrorist Fence,” 
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/missionhome.asp?MissionID=45187& (accessed March 8, 
2009); Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives: Israel's anti-terrorist fence”; Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives – Israel's Security Fence”; and Israel Ministry of Defense, “Israel’s Security 




Figure 3.   Annualized Scatter Plot of Palestinians in Detention versus Palestinian Attacks.63 
As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, as the Anti-Terrorist Fence grew and as Israel 
detained more Palestinians, the level of Palestinian attacks decreased.  With one (possibly 
two) outlier,64 all points seem to reasonably fall along a negatively sloped band—that is, 
the direction of the band of observations of Palestinian attacks becomes lower on the y-
axis as the observations along the x-axis increase.  This is the relationship we expect to 
find if Israeli’s counterterrorism lines of operation are effective in reducing the volume of 
Palestinian attacks. 
2. Simple Time Series Analysis 
Our initial analysis of scatter plots led us to investigate the relationship of targeted 
killing and Palestinian attacks in a very basic time series analysis.  The results of this 
                                                 
63 We include the B’Tselem data on Palestinian attacks and Israeli detentions from January 1, 2001 
through December 31, 2008.  See B’Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities” and B’Tselem: The Israeli Information 
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Detainees & Prisoners: Statistics on Palestinians in 
the custody of the Israeli security forces,” 
http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp (accessed November 11, 2009). 
64 In Figure 2, the 2000 outlying data point can perhaps be explained by the fact that the data for that 
year is only three month’s worth (as the Second Intifada began in the later-half of 2000).  In Figure 3, the 
2001data point could be viewed as an outlier, and can perhaps be explained by the Israeli Defense Force’s 
occupation of the West Bank at the beginning of that year (Operation Defensive Shield). 
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analysis are shown in Figure 4 and indicate a time-lagged relationship between the 
instances of terrorist attacks and instances of targeted killing—though the relationship 
over the initial phases of the Second Intifada were the inverse of what we expected to 
find, based on the description of the program as a preventative measure.  
 
Figure 4.   Monthly Episodes of Violence.65 
In Figure 4, we observed an initial time lag between the peaks and troughs of 
violence with Palestinian attacks leading Israeli targeted killing operations by 
approximately one month.  This lag is consistent for the first two years of the Second 
Intifada and continues until December 2004.  Although we will analyze this lag in more 
detail in Chapter III, we are interested in this observation because the actual lag is the 
opposite of what we initially expected.  As noted above in the first scatter plot, we 
expected a temporal relationship wherein Israel’s targeted killing operations would 
precede Palestinian attacks.  We will investigate the significance of this time lag in 
Chapter III, but for now, the data suggest that, at a minimum, the targeted killing program 
appears to function more as a reprisal mechanism than a preemptive tool and that the 
 
 
                                                 
65 We include the B’Tselem data on Palestinian attacks and Israeli targeted killing from October 1, 
2000 through December 31, 2008.  See B’Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities.” 
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relationship between these two variables is the inverse of what we initially expected to 
see—both in terms of volume and in terms of the time lag observed between the Israeli 
action and Palestinian attacks. 
3. Geospatial Analysis 
In order to investigate further the relationship between targeted killing and 
Palestinian attacks, we turned to a geospatial analysis of the violence to attempt to 
analyze what relationship exists, if any, between the locations of attacks in this conflict.  
Using the same data as in the analyses above, we geo-located each instance of Israeli 
targeted killing and each instance of Palestinian attack and aggregated them to a yearly 
unit of measure (for the purposes of simplifying our initial analysis).  We also 
differentiated targeted killings and Palestinian attacks by the magnitude of the violence.66  
The magnitude is a measure of how many fatalities resulted from a single instance of 
violence.  We analyzed the magnitude of the violence to determine if the overall severity 
of the episodes of Israeli targeted killing and Palestinian attacks had changed in any 









                                                 
66 In Figures 5–10, the size of the green squares (Israeli targeted killings) and red circles (Palestinian 
attacks) indicates the magnitude of a single violent incident, i.e. the larger the shape, the more individuals 
were killed in one incident (either targeted killing or Palestinian attack).  The scale for targeted killings 
runs from 1-15, and the scale for Palestinian attacks runs from 1-25. These graphics were built using 
ArcGIS 9.3 (ArcMap 9.3, ESRI, 2008) from the same B’Tselem data we have been analyzing throughout 


































Figure 7.   Annualized Location and Magnitude of Palestinian Attacks and Israeli Targeted 
Killings (2006–2008). 
As Figures 5–7 show, the spatial distribution of violence moves in a 
southwesterly direction from 2000 through 2008, and as the location of violence shifts, so 
does the magnitude of the violence.  While there are a few outliers in the data, the overall 
trend toward fewer and less violent attacks seems to hold.  We also notice that both 
location and magnitude of violence begin to be affected around the 2003 timeframe, but 
based solely on this initial geospatial analysis, we are hard-pressed to draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
As a next step, we then included an additional independent variable—construction 
of the Anti-Terrorist Fence—to begin to investigate the relative effects of multiple Israeli 
lines of operation.  Looking at our geospatial analysis again, this time adding the Anti-
Terrorist Fence data, we begin to “see” the interrelated nature of the independent 
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variables.  Whereas in Figures 5–7, we could only conclude that “something” seemed to 
begin affecting both location and magnitude of violence around 2003, in Figures 8–10,67 
we observed (what seems to be) the effect of the Anti-Terrorist Fence in terms of both a 
reduction in violence and in the spatial distribution of violence within Israel and the 
Occupied Territories. 
 
Figure 8.   Annualized Location and Magnitude of Palestinian Attacks, Israeli Targeted 
Killings and Anti-Terrorist Fence Construction (2000–2002). 
 
 
                                                 
67 The data used to build the Anti-Terrorist Fence overlays was obtained from B’Tselem, “Separation 
Barrier: Statistics”; United Nations, “Barrier Gates Open” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel 
Diplomatic Network”; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives: Israel's anti-terrorist fence”; Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives – Israel's Security Fence”; and Israel Ministry of Defense, 






Figure 9.   Annualized Location and Magnitude of Palestinian Attacks, Israeli Targeted 




Figure 10.   Annualized Location and Magnitude of Palestinian Attacks, Israeli Targeted 
Killings and Anti-Terrorist Fence Construction (2006–2008). 
The severity of Israeli targeted killings, almost exclusively conducted in the Gaza 
Strip after 2004, seems fairly constant over the time period analyzed.  Palestinian attacks, 
by contrast, more significantly decrease in magnitude in the first year after the 
completion of the first section of the Anti-Terrorist Fence in 2003.  That overall trend 
persisted through the end of 2008. 
As a final step in our geospatial analysis, we then conducted an analysis of the 
mean center of Palestinian attacks to understand any spatial patterns in the violence over 
time (i.e., the apparent shift in the distribution of violence and the reduction in 
magnitude).  Our hypothesis was that the violence was shifting away from Israeli 
population centers and that this shift was not random.  Our findings, again aggregated to 
the annual level, are shown in Figure 11.   
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Figure 11.   Annualized Mean Center of Episodic Palestinian Attacks.68 
From 2000 until the initial segment of the Anti-Terrorist Fence was completed in 
2003, the locus of violence for both types of attacks was nearer the population centers of 
Israel and within the West Bank.  As the construction of the Fence continued, the locus of 
violence began a steady migration to the southwest and the magnitude of violence was 
also reduced.  Here again, we note that the program of targeted killing and the 
construction of the Fence were but two of several Israeli lines of operation utilized during 
the Second Intifada in order to curb violence.  For now, however, we add just the fence in 
order to introduce the impact that studying just one additional variable can have.  The 
findings from Figures 8–10 suggest that the Anti-Terrorist Fence played a role in altering 
the distribution of violence both spatially and in terms of magnitude.  More detailed 
analysis of this line of operation follows in Chapter III, but for now this finding 
                                                 
68 This graphic was built using ArcGIS 9.3 (ArcMap 9.3, ESRI, 2008) from the same B’Tselem data 
we have been analyzing throughout our thesis.  See B’Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities”; B’Tselem, 
“Separation Barrier: Statistics”; United Nations, “Barrier Gates Open” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“Israel Diplomatic Network”; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives: Israel's anti-terrorist 
fence”; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives – Israel's Security Fence”; and Israel Ministry of 
Defense, “Israel’s Security Fence.” 
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reinforces our hypothesis that the Anti-Terrorist Fence likely had a significant impact on 
both the reduction of Palestinian attacks and in moving violence away from concentration 
of Israeli citizens. 
Yet analyses left this basic are ultimately unsatisfying because they offer only a 
glimpse into the correlation of Israeli targeted killing and absence or presence of 
Palestinian attacks in a very basic time series or spatial analysis.  Such analysis offers 
little insight into the causal mechanism in the cycle of violence and does not allow for an 
analysis of non-geo-located independent variables nor whether variables are even related.  
In this case, clearly adding arrest data to our analysis would address another major line of 
operation and would provide some insight into the relative impact of arrests in curbing 
terror attacks.  While arrest data provides additional analytic rigor to the study of the 
Second Intifada data, simply looking at arrest data in isolation, in response to one 
additional line of operation, or analyzing arrest trends over time relative to terror attacks 
still only allows for a correlation of the two phenomena. 
4. Regression Analysis 
To address this analytic shortfall, we will turn to a more inclusive analysis to add 
to the simple time series review of the data in order to gain initial insight into the 
interrelationship of the three study variables introduced so far: targeted killings, arrests 
and the Anti-Terrorist Fence.  By conducting a regression analysis of the aggregated data, 
we seek to uncover the causal mechanisms at work in the cycle of violence.  Though a 
regression analysis will help to derive the relative impact of the various lines of operation 
under consideration, we recognize that the Second Intifada is not reducible to only three 
variables.  Therefore, in our initial analysis we will use the error term of the regression 
equation to account for the impact of other Israeli lines of operation, but will add 
additional variables to our regression modeling in Chapter III.  Shown below is the initial 
regression model utilized to begin a more detailed exploration of the effects of each line 
of operation used by Israel during the Second Intifada.  As noted earlier, following 
chapters will use this basic formula to begin an analysis of the conflict and to better 
understand the relative impact of each line of operation in terms of strategic desired end 
state attainment. 
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The initial regression analysis will begin with the general form of the equation: 
E(y│x) = exp(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + ε) 
In the above equation, we note the study or dependent variable as incidents of 
Palestinian attacks as a function of three independent variables (e.g., β1x1) an intercept 
value (β0) and an error term (ε) that represents the unknown impact of diplomacy, 
economic sanctions, checkpoints / barriers to movement, collective punishment, et al.  
The intercept value is the level of Palestinian violence that would occur in the absence of 
an Israeli counterterrorism campaign.  Given the basic time-series analysis above, there is 
reason to believe the intercept value provides useful insight into the baseline level of 
violence, i.e., if Israel did nothing, there would still be a level of Palestinian attacks.  The 
three independent variables operationalized at this point are: β1x1 representing targeted 
killing, β2x2 representing the Anti-Terrorist Fence, and β3x3 representing Israeli arrests of 
Palestinian militants.  As the analysis progresses in later chapters, we will add 
independent variables to the analysis in order to more fully develop the relative impact of 
each line of operation as well as developing an understanding of the impact of those 
actions currently included in the error term.     
In the first instance of regression analysis, we seek to derive a more general 
understanding of the operative relationships among the three study variables.  While a 
simple time interval represents a tempting measure of effectiveness, the sequence of 
attack and reprisal is not bounded simply by time.  Therefore, considering both time and 
space in analyzing the effects of targeted killing operations is critical to forming a 
judgment of the efficacy of both individual cases at the tactical and operational levels as 
well as the aggregate effects these operations accrue to the overall strategic desired end 
state of such campaigns.  By using an integrated model that considers not only the effects 
of targeted killing, but also examines the other lines of operation used in conjunction with 
targeted killing, we seek a better understanding of which operations more directly 
impacted the reduction or increase in Palestinian attacks.  This is the basis for 
determining the success or failure of the Israeli targeted killing program as a line of 
operation within the overall Israeli counterterrorism campaign. 
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D. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND WAY AHEAD 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the events leading up to the Second 
Intifada were multifaceted.  The events of the Second Intifada did little to provide a clear 
understanding of the forces at work in the violence between Israel and the Palestinians.  
These historical factors have made past treatment of the subject difficult and superficial.  
Similarly, as noted in Chapter I, previous analysis of this subject has shed little light into 
what actually is contributing to the success and failure of the Israeli response to the 
Second Intifada.  The analysis in this chapter was constructed using a building block 
methodology to layer analytical frameworks in order to begin to reveal the complex 
forces at work.  This analysis is useful because it shows how the many factors involved in 
the conflict interrelate and how the several variables involved have different levels of 
impact on the levels of violence. 
We have demonstrated that a simple bivariate analysis of the relationship between 
targeted killing and Palestinian attacks are the inverse of the expected relationship.  
Given this finding, we then explored the relationship of these two variables over time.  
Again, the analysis revealed findings that were perhaps counterintuitive.  That is to say, 
the time series analysis of the Israeli program of targeted killing appears to suggest a 
response relationship to Palestinian attacks and not pre-emptive—contrary to the stated 
purpose of the program.  Yet, this analysis is not sufficient to prove the causal 
relationship and, indeed, may be a spurious finding.  Thus, we undertook a geospatial 
analysis of the data in order to observe the data spatially.  This analysis provided novel 
insight into patterns of violence in terms of both magnitude and location.  Included in the 
stepwise geospatial analysis was the addition of the Anti-Terror Fence as a line of 
operation.  The results of this analysis showed a general movement of violence south and 
west from the Israeli population centers along with a diminished magnitude of violence 
as the attacks migrated southwest. 
These basic findings suggest a need to conduct a detailed regression analysis of 
the major lines of operation in order to understand the forces that influence the levels of 
violence during the Second Intifada as well as their relative impacts.  This chapter merely 
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introduced the most basic structure of a regression model in order to lay out the major 
variables under consideration.  In Chapter III, we more fully develop the model and begin 
to draw out additional variables from the error term of the basic model.  Adding 
additional variables will help drive an understanding of which lines of operation aid the 
reduction in Palestinian attacks and which are either neutral or actually detract from 
Israeli desired end state attainment.  Additionally, Chapter III will briefly explore 
vignettes of the conditions ongoing at the time analyzed.  Through these vignettes, we 
attempt to provide some richness to the quantitative analysis in order to capture those 
actions that are difficult or impossible to quantify, yet may have significant impact on the 
conflict outcomes.  We conclude Chapter III with a brief discussion of the analytic 
findings as well as their implications for future conflicts. 
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III. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF 
TARGETED KILLING 
A. A BRIEF VIGNETTE 
On March 29, 2002, the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield—in effect a 
reoccupation of the West Bank—in order to reassert control over that Palestinian 
population and “wage an uncompromising fight against this [Palestinian] terror, uproot 
these weeds, and smash their infrastructure.”69  Earlier that month, small-scale IDF 
incursions into the West Bank resulted in a spike in Palestinian fatalities.  Palestinian 
attacks that March also spiked to their highest levels, culminating with the March 27 
suicide attack at Netanya’s Park Hotel that killed 25 civilians.  As rationale for his 
decision to reenter the West Bank, Prime Minister Sharon offered to his cabinet, 
“Palestinians must be hit, and it must be very painful... We must cause them losses, 
victims, so that they feel a heavy price.”70 
In the months surrounding Operation Defensive Shield, admittedly a brief time-
slice in the Second Intifada’s overall course, a number of Israeli lines of operation were 
in play.  That is, there were a number of inputs into the system of violence that were 
presumably having some kind of effect on the output (Palestinian attacks).  Some of those 
inputs included: Israel more than doubled the number of Palestinians in detention;  
episodes of targeted killing continued at a stable level during this time; construction of 
the Anti-Terrorist Fence had not yet begun, but deliberations were ongoing within the 
Israeli government (construction began in June 2002, just after Operation Defensive 
Shield officially concluded); both the magnitude and episodic count of Palestinian 
violence, as well as Israeli violence (episodes that were not targeted killings), was 
                                                 
69 Ariel Sharon, “PM Sharon's Address to the Nation,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 
2002, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2002/PM%20Sharon-
s%20Address%20to%20the%20Nation%20-%2031-Mar-2002 (accessed on October 6, 2009). 
70  Matt Rees, et al., “Streets Red with Blood,” Time Online Edition, March 18, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1002012,00.html (accessed on October 6, 2009). 
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noticeably on the rise; and political maneuvers (both via internal and external actors) 
were ongoing in direct response to the spike in overall violence. 
The analysis that follows in this chapter is not specific to the Operation Defensive 
Shield vignette.  The forgoing brief discussion simply underscores the interactive nature 
of the variables at play.  Targeted killing was certainly at work, but so were a host of 
other lines of operation.  In order to untangle these variables and, most importantly, 
derive their relative weights of effort within this cycle of violence, we turn to regression 
analysis. 
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
While the preceding vignette neatly captures a moment in time when Israel 
prosecuted several lines of operation, it still fails to capture the relative impact of these 
lines of operation.  That is to say, while the vignette acknowledges the existence of many 
areas of Israeli effort during Operation Defensive Shield, any understanding of the 
relative effectiveness of each of these efforts is uncertain at best—or worse, likely 
becomes even more confused as additional lines of operation are added to the analytical 
mix.  What follows is a brief description of our data and methods, and then an iterative 
analysis of the factors employed during the Second Intifada by Israel.  Using the 
regression model introduced in Chapter II, each step begins to draw out the relative 
effectiveness of Israeli operations during the Second Intifada. 
1. Data and Methods 
As was introduced in Chapter II, our primary data source was the complied 
statistics from the B’Tselem website.71  For our dependent variable, we aggregated the 
episodes of Palestinian attacks (those resulting in Israeli deaths) to the monthly level 
beginning in October 2000 through December 2008.72  We followed the same 
methodology to derive the independent variable of targeted killing—again aggregating 
                                                 
71 B’Tselem, “Statistics.” 
72 This aggregation yielded the 98 observations referenced in the below analyses—the number of 
months in the data range. 
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episodes to the monthly level over the same date range.  Our independent variable of 
kilometers of Anti-Terrorist Fence completed was an amalgamation of data sources that 
included information from B’Tselem’s complied statistics, as well as from the United 
Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance73 and Israel’s Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Defense.74  Our independent variable of the number of 
Palestinians detained by Israel also came from B’Tselem’s compiled statistics.75 
We note that as this chapter builds, we attempt to bridge between the quantitative 
and qualitative spheres of analysis.  In so doing, we account for time-lagged independent 
variables, control independent variables, and dummy independent variables.  The time-
lagged variables retain the same data source as the non-lagged variables from which they 
were derived.  Similarly, the control variables are drawn from a simple histogram 
analysis of the datasets already discussed.  The sources for the dummy variables are 
discussed at some length in Section C of this chapter. 
Because we are attempting to explain variation in the count of Palestinian attacks, 
it is more appropriate to use models designed for count outcomes than a traditional linear 
regression model (i.e., ordinary least squares), which is designed for continuous variables 
and when used with counts can result in inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates.76  
The Poisson regression model is the most basic count model and the one employed 
here.77  It assumes that the probability of a count is determined by a Poisson distribution, 
where the mean of the distribution is determined by the model’s independent variables.  
If y is a random variable indicating the number of times that an event has occurred, then 
the expected value of y can be written as: 
                                                 
73 United Nations, “Barrier Gates Open.” 
74 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel Diplomatic Network”; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“Saving Lives – Israel's anti-terrorist fence”; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Saving Lives – Israel's 
Security Fence”; and Israel Ministry of Defense, “Israel’s Security Fence.” 
75 B’Tselem, “Detainees & Prisoners.” 
76 Scott J. Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 217; and Scott J. Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for 
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata, (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2006), 349. 
77 We initially estimated our models using both Negative Binomial and Poisson regression that, when 
comparing their respective goodness-of-fit measures, suggested the choice of Poisson regression was more 
appropriate for modeling the data in this case. 
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E(y│x) = exp(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + βkxk + … + βKxK) 
where β0 indicates the estimated coefficient for the constant and β1x1 through βKxK 
indicate the estimated coefficients for the independent variables included in the model.78 
2. Iteration 1:  Analysis of the Baseline Model 
The original model from Chapter II addressed what we assessed to be the three 
lines of operation for Israel during the Second Intifada and is shown below with modified 
subscripts for our variables: 
E(yPA│x) = exp(β0 + βTKxTK + βATFxATF + βDTxDT + ε) 
Where: 
yPA = the number of Palestinian attacks 
β0 = an intercept value 
βTKxTK = the number of Israeli targeted killing episodes 
βATFxATF = the number of kilometers of Anti-Terrorist Fence completed 
βDTxDT = the change in the number of Palestinians detained by Israel 
ε = error term 
Our hypothesis for this first model is that, based on the initial temporal and spatial 
analysis of Chapter II, targeted killing will exhibit a positive effect on the rate of 
Palestinian attacks, while both the Anti-Terrorist Fence and detention of Palestinians will 
exhibit a negative effect.  If the hypothesis is correct, these results will indicate that 
targeted killing was responsible for an increase in Palestinian attacks, while the 
construction of the wall and increased numbers of arrests would serve to reduce the levels 
of Palestinian attacks over the course of the Second Intifada.  Furthermore, depending on 
                                                 
78 Stata 10 (StataCorp. 2007)  is used to estimate all of the models in this chapter.  Of note, three of the 
independent variables included missing data at certain time points: the length of the Anti-Terrorist Fence, 
the number of detainees, and the number of homes destroyed (included in discussions further in the 
chapter).  We used Stata 10’s ipolate function to linearly interpolate/extrapolate to these missing values on 
these variables. 
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the size of the coefficient, these results would begin to provide a sense of the relative 
impact on the increase or decrease in the levels of Palestinian attacks. 
Depent Variable:  Palestinian 





Kilometers of Anti-Terrorism -.0481516
Fence Completed (per 10 km) (.0137842)****









Robust standard errors in parentheses.
****significant at .1%; ***significant at 1% level; 
**significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level  
Table 1.   Analysis of the Baseline Model.79 
In Table 1, we note that the coefficient for targeted killing is positive and 
statistically significant, while the coefficients for both the Anti-Terrorist Fence and Israeli 
detentions are both negative and, at least for the Anti-Terrorist Fence, statistically 
significant.  These results confirm our hypothesis and also begin to reveal a sense of the 
impact each line of operation has relative to the others.  However, one must exercise a 
modicum of caution when directly comparing the values of these coefficients.  Because 
                                                 
79 Admittedly simplistic in this form, Tables 1-5 build on one another, showing the regression results 
of each iterative model.  In each table, the numbered columns denote the model iteration and their 
variables’ and fitness measures.  A brief description of those variables and fitness measures is in the left-
most column. 
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the variables are of different types, we cannot directly compare the size of their 
coefficients.  Nonetheless, we then leverage these findings to begin investigating the 
percent change in expected counts of a per unit increase in each line of operation—we do 
exactly this at the conclusion of this chapter. 
Finally, we note that this initial model is a reasonably good fit for the data with a 
relatively large negative log likelihood score and large AIC and BIC scores.  These 
indicate that, while decidedly parsimonious, the model captures the variability in the lines 
of operation and their effects on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the fit can be 
improved,80 and from what we learned from the above vignette, the baseline model does 
not provide a complete picture of the observed variation in the levels of Palestinian 
attacks.  For a better understanding of this variation, we turn to the next iteration of the 
model in the following section. 
3. Iteration 2:  Understanding the Impact of Other Violence 
Based on the incomplete treatment of the previous iteration, we began a more in-
depth regression analysis in an attempt to add explanatory power to our model.  Based on 
an understanding of the case study, and our earlier suspicion that perhaps “violence 
begets violence, “we added another variable to our initial model: acts of Israeli violence 
that resulted in Palestinian deaths that were not targeted killing operations.81  Our 
regression analysis then took the general form of the equation: 
E(yPA│x) = exp(β0 + βTKxTK + βATFxATF + βDTxDT + βNTKxNTK + ε) 
                                                 
80 We draw attention to the variability in these measures across the iterative models.  While general 
discussion of fitness will be presented in the text, in-depth analysis of various fitness measures is not 
included in this thesis. 
81 As previously discussed, Israel has been responsible for the death of over 9,400 Palestinians over 
the course of the Second Intifada.  Targeted killing operations account for an extremely small portion of 
those deaths (roughly 4 percent).  If it is truly the case that ‘violence begets violence,’ we suspect that the 
scale and magnitude of the non-targeted killing episodes hold perhaps inherent explanatory power vis-à-vis 
the system of violence described in this thesis.  As a proxy measure of this hypothesis, we built a scatter 
plot (not shown) similar to Figures 1-3 above plotting Palestinian attacks versus Israeli violent incidents 
that were not targeted killing operations.  That scatter plot showed the direction of the band of observations 
of Palestinian attacks becomes higher on the y-axis as the observations of non-targeted killings along the x-
axis increase.  Thus, in the first step of our iterative analysis of our model, we chose to add non-targeted 
killing episodes to the equation.  As before, data on these episodes was obtained from B’Tselem 
(B’Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities”). 
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where βNTKxNTK represents the addition of the independent variable of episodes of non-
targeted killing operations and all other variables remain as shown above in the first 
iteration. 
Our hypothesis is that with the addition of the non-targeted killing variable, 
regression analysis will reveal a positive coefficient.  That is, Palestinian deaths resulting 
from Israeli non-targeted killing operations and/or actions—in the aggregate—have the 
effect of inciting violence, increasing the level Palestinian attacks against Israel.  The 
other variables should retain their relative positive or negative coefficients. 
Depent Variable:  Palestinian 
Attacks (resulting in Israeli 
deaths)
Iteration (1) Iteration (2)
Targeted Killing .07909 .0710679
(0.0296406)*** (.0351212)**
Kilometers of Anti-Terrorism -.0481516 -.039109
Fence Completed (per 10 km) (.0137842)**** (.013887)***







Log Pseudo-Likelihood -157.80254 -154.29693
Pseudo R-squared 0.3789 0.3927
BIC 333.945 331.5187
AIC 323.6051 318.5939
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
****significant at .1%; ***significant at 1% level; 
**significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level
^This value was .048 away from being significant at the 10% level  
Table 2.   Analysis of the Baseline Model, Adding Non-Targeted Killing. 
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Table 2 contains the results of a regression analysis of the model described in 
Iteration 2 (as seen in column 2, with column 1 containing the results of the first iteration 
for a side-by-side comparison).  Interestingly, and as hypothesized, the non-targeted 
killing variable carries a positive coefficient, although a relatively small one with a low 
level of statistical significance.  Additionally, the statistical significance of our 
coefficients drops between iterations one and two.  Regardless, as we discovered in Table 
1, targeted killing still leads to an increase in Palestinian attacks, while the Anti-Terrorist 
Fence and detentions lead to a decrease.  Overall, our fitness and constant scores, as well 
as the increase in standard error values (from the first iteration), suggest this model is not 
as adequate as our first iteration.82   
Violence perpetrated by Israel against Palestinians—whether targeted killing, riot 
control gone bad, or any range of military operation in between—seems to have a 
positive effect on the level of Palestinian violence directed against Israel.  And, at the 
very least, Israel’s actions along these lines do not help to reduce Palestinian attacks.  
Still, we suspect that the non-targeted killing episodes play a role in this dynamic, but 
perhaps in a more interactive sense with as-yet un-captured variables. 
4. Iteration 3:  Past Violence Matters in Current Analysis 
As the previous iteration suggests, episodes of Israeli violence—targeted or not—
appear to increase the levels of Palestinian attacks. Our time-series analysis from Chapter 
II also suggests that this impact may bleed over from one time period to another.  In other 
words, past violence may have some influence on the levels of future violence.  In this 
iteration, we explore whether targeted killing events of previous months have a positive 
or negative impact on the levels of Palestinian attacks in the current period of analysis.  
Additionally, we investigate the impact of the previous month levels of Palestinian 
attacks as a time-lagged auto-regression variable. 
 
                                                 
82 Again, we draw attention to the fitness scores in the bottom section of the table. 
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After modifying the model from Iteration 2 for inclusion of the time lagged 
variables, the model equation becomes: 
E(yPA│x) = exp(β0 + βTKxTK + βATFxATF + βDTxDT + βNTKxNTK + βTK-1xTK-1 + 
βPA-1xPA-1 + ε) 
where βTK-1xTK-1 represents the addition of the independent variable of episodes of 
targeted killing operations from the previous month and βPA-1xPA-1 represents the addition 
of the independent variable of episodes of Palestinian attacks from the previous month.  
All other variables remain as shown above in the second iteration. 
Our hypothesis is that actors in this system do not forget previous acts of violence 
and are, in fact, influenced to act (or not act) by the events and conditions of previous 
time periods.  In terms of the regression analysis, the introduction of a lagged variable for 
instances of Israeli targeted killing should produce a negative coefficient if the program is 
working, but needs additional time to reveal its effects.  If, as we see in our earlier 
analysis, the targeted killing program is counterproductive, the coefficient will remain 
positive.  Based on our findings above and in Chapter II, we expect a positive coefficient 
in the lagged targeted killing variable. 
The time-lagged variable for Palestinian attacks should reveal a negative 
coefficient if continued Palestinian attacks are simply “wearing out” Palestinian groups.  
Alternatively, if the attacks serve to sustain or increase the morale of Palestinian actors, 
the coefficient would be positive.  Our hypothesis is that the former outcome, a “wearing 
out” effect, is more likely and we expect a negative coefficient. 
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Depent Variable:  Palestinian 
Attacks (resulting in Israeli 
deaths)
Iteration (1) Iteration (2) Iteration (3)
Targeted Killing .07909 .0710679 .0756638
(0.0296406)*** (.0351212)** (.0379115)**
Kilometers of Anti-Terrorism -.0481516 -.039109 -.0403573
Fence Completed (per 10 km) (.0137842)**** (.013887)*** (.0144412)***
Detainees (per 100 detainees) -.0059536 -.0082295 -.0108311
(.0063514) (.0065457) (.0070556)#
Non-Targeted Killing .0088188 .0120916
(.0060926)^ (.0059949)**
Targeted Killing .0081596
(lagged by 1 Month) (.02999)
Palestinian Attacks -.0476828
(lagged by 1 Month) (.0262158)*
Constant 1.775083 1.533947 1.742337
(0.1566742)**** (.2140839)**** (.2472228)****
Observations 98 98 98
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -157.80254 -154.29693 -152.60996
Pseudo R-squared 0.3789 0.3927 0.3993
BIC 333.945 331.5187 337.3147
AIC 323.6051 318.5939 319.2199
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
****significant at .1%; ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level
^This value was .048 away from being significant at the 10% level
#This value was .025 away from being significant at the 10% level  
Table 3.   Analysis of the Baseline Model, Adding Non-Targeted Killing, Lagging Targeted 
Killing and Palestinian Attacks. 
Table 3 contains the results of a regression analysis of the model described in 
Iteration 3.  Interestingly, the one month lagged Palestinian attacks variable carries a 
relatively large negative coefficient and is statistically significant.  The time lagged auto-
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regression value is nearly on par with the measure for the impact of the Anti-Terrorist 
Fence—itself a significant contributor to reduction on Palestinian attacks.  This finding 
suggests that our hypothesis, the presence of a “wearing out” effect, merits additional 
consideration.  The one month lagged value for targeted killing is positive, but in a very 
weak sense.  The coefficient for this variable is small and not statistically significant, 
suggesting both that the programmatic effects may require additional time to work but the 
results may vary widely across the spectrum of effectiveness as time progresses.  That is 
to say, as the time from an instance of a targeted killing operation increases, it appears to 
be less positive, but the ability to ascertain the true impact becomes more problematic—
as evidenced by the lack of statistical significance for this variable and coefficient.83 
Additionally, the statistical significance of the variable coefficients has increased 
from Iteration 2 and the standard errors have, on balance, reduced slightly with the 
introduction of the time-lagged variables, suggesting that this model may be slightly 
more adequate than that of Iteration 2.  Furthermore, as we noted in Tables 1 and 2, the 
targeted killing coefficient is still positive, while the coefficients for Anti-Terrorist Fence 
and detentions remain negative.  Again, this suggests that the effects of targeted killing 
act to increase Palestinian attacks (in the aggregate), while the effects of the Fence act to 
decrease Palestinian attacks (in the aggregate).  Overall, the fitness and constant scores 
for the third model suggest it is not as adequate as our first but is better, on balance, than 
the second.84  That said, the current model is beginning to provide a more complete 
picture of the interactive and iterative nature of this system.  We suspect additional 
variables that control for within-year variation of variable coefficients may aid in teasing 
out additional analytic value from this model.  
                                                 
83 Though we do not include further time lagged analysis in this manuscript, we ran several iterations 
of longer time lag intervals in order to ascertain if some inflection point for the targeted killing variable 
ever caused the coefficient to become negative—in essence helping to achieve the desired end state of 
reducing Palestinian levels of violence.  At the six month mark, i.e., βTK-6ΧTK-6, the coefficient was 
negative, but with a large standard error and with a very large p-value that indicated the introduction of 
random effects vice causality.  As such we limit the introduction of time lagged variables to the one month 
level to introduce the concept that may be studied in greater detail by future researchers. 
84 See the fitness scores in the bottom section of Table 3. 
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5. Iteration 4:  Controlling for Environmental Factors 
From the analysis of the previous iterations of the model—and having captured 
those variables that are perhaps the easiest to quantify, lag, analyze and interpret—we 
turned to controlling for environmental factors that may have skewed the results of our 
regressions.  Our model then took the form of: 
E(yPA│x) = exp(β0 + βTKxTK + βATFxATF + βDTxDT + βNTKxNTK + βTK-1xTK-1 + 
βPA-1xPA-1 + βSUMxSUM + βCY02xCY02 + ε) 
where βSUMxSUM represents the addition of the control variable of the summer months and 
βCY02xCY02 represents the addition of the control variable of calendar year 2002. 
Our hypothesis is that factors such as the calendar year or season may impact the 
model, requiring we hold these factors constant to determine the “true” relationships 
between our study variables.  The data seem to suggest a general increase in the 
propensity for violent activity as seasonal weather heats up over the summer months.  For 
our thesis, we include May–September in the “summer” control variable.85  Similarly, the 
levels and magnitude of violence in calendar year 2002 suggest that that year has an 
effect on the analysis of the aggregate system of violence—the spikes in Palestinian 
attacks and Israeli non-targeted killing episodes in 2002 are the highest yet of the Second 
Intifada.86 
                                                 
85 We built rudimentary histograms (not shown) plotting normalized scores for episodes of violence 
(targeted killing, Palestinian attacks and non-targeted killing) versus calendar month.  The results of the 
histograms suggested the delineation of this variable’s parameters. 
86 This claim is based on normalized episode counts.  In the case of non-targeted killing, the 2000 data 
is clearly an outlier to the remaining trend for that dataset. 
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Depent Variable:  Palestinian 
Attacks (resulting in Israeli 
deaths)
Iteration (1) Iteration (2) Iteration (3) Iteration (4)
Targeted Killing .07909 .0710679 .0756638 .0898683
(0.0296406)*** (.0351212)** (.0379115)** (.0376532)**
Kilometers of Anti-Terrorism -.0481516 -.039109 -.0403573 -.0177135
Fence Completed (per 10 km) (.0137842)**** (.013887)*** (.0144412)*** (.0169507)
Detainees (per 100 detainees) -.0059536 -.0082295 -.0108311 -.0226457
(.0063514) (.0065457) (.0070556)# (.0082659)***
Non-Targeted Killing .0088188 .0120916 .013895
(.0060926)^ (.0059949)** (.0044081)***
Targeted Killing .0081596 .0254436
(lagged by 1 Month) (.02999) (.0301812)
Palestinian Attacks -.0476828 -.0836695





Constant 1.775083 1.533947 1.742337 1.859897
(0.1566742)**** (.2140839)**** (.2472228)**** (.2235774)****
Observations 98 98 98 98
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -157.80254 -154.29693 -152.60996 -148.18801
Pseudo R-squared 0.3789 0.3927 0.3993 0.4167
BIC 333.945 331.5187 337.3147 337.6407
AIC 323.6051 318.5939 319.2199 314.376
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
****significant at .1%; ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level
^This value was .048 away from being significant at the 10% level
#This value was .025 away from being significant at the 10% level  
Table 4.   Analysis of the Baseline Model, Adding Non-Targeted Killing, Lagging Targeted 
Killing and Palestinian Attacks, Controlling for Summer and 2002. 
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In Table 4, the estimated respective coefficients for “summer” and “2002” are 
substantively positive and statistically significant at the one percent level—suggesting 
these variables are at work in the system of violence in a way that makes sense within the 
context of the case study.  Additionally, with the exception of the “Fence” variable, all of 
the factors in this model not only increased in value, but also in terms of statistical 
significance over the previous model.  This suggests that we have a better explanatory 
model in this iteration and can trust the coefficients of the variables (even though our log 
likelihood and AIC scores decreased slightly from the previous the model).87 
As we prepare to shift gears in the next section of this chapter, the discussion of 
coefficients becomes important.  The overall fitness scores of the model have dropped 
somewhat, but the coefficients are largely statistically significant.  The coefficients for 
targeted killing, non-targeted killing and targeted killing lagged by one month remain 
positive, and, with the exception of the lagged targeted killing variable, are statistically 
significant.  This appears to confirm our general hypothesis that “violence begets 
violence”—that is, as the episodes of targeted killing or non-targeted killing increase, so 
do levels of Palestinian violence.  Conversely, the continued negative coefficients for the 
Fence and detainee variables square with our hypothesis that the more non-kinetic Israeli 
lines of operation have an impact in reducing the levels of Palestinian attacks over time.  
Additionally, the negative lagged Palestinian attack coefficient suggests that Palestinian 
violence itself contributes to a reduction in Palestinian violence (i.e., the Palestinians are, 
in fact, “wearing themselves out”).  Finally, our recently-introduced control variables are 
also positive and statistically significant, indicating we have accurately controlled for 
those factors in our model. 
Over the past few pages, we have iteratively built upon the basic model presented 
in Chapter II.  Through Iteration 4, we have addressed more than double the number of 
original factors, while still remaining (in our estimation) parsimonious.  In the next 
section, we will attempt to lay the groundwork for further unpacking this system of 
violence, by addressing those factors that seem (prima facie) to be unavailable for the 
                                                 
87 As noted in other iterations of our regression analysis, we controlled for a variety of months and 
years, with the variables presented in our tables carrying the only statistically significant values. 
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kind of analysis presented in this thesis, but nonetheless have an impact on the situation 
on the ground in Israel and the Occupied Territories.  This discussion is important in that 
it at least scratches the surface of empirically analyzing some of the critical social 
interactions involved in this system of violence.  We provide detailed descriptions of 
these factors (peace talks, Israeli incursions into Palestinian-controlled territory, and 
demolitions of Palestinian homes) before offering a quantitative analysis of their 
consequences. 
C. THE ERROR TERM UNPACKED 
In an effort to capture the more nuanced, but still significant, Israeli lines of 
operation, this section identifies three additional variables that help untangle the 
complexities surrounding Israeli-Palestinian violence during the Second Intifada.  
Though not exhaustive, these variables include the impact of peace talks, major Israeli 
military incursions into the Occupied Territories and the demolition of Palestinian homes 
in the Occupied Territories by Israel.88 The effects of these actions are difficult to 
quantify by nature, but we hypothesize they are significant to the conflict nonetheless. 
1. Peace Talks 
To presuppose that all Israelis and Palestinians view peace talks favorably ignores 
reality.  The more extreme factions on both sides of the issue—whose popularity changes 
according to levels of violence—restrict their respective governments’ abilities to 
negotiate.  As a whole, Israel has to contend with the strong influence of its more 
conservative elements, “the religious Zionists (who view possession of Biblical land as 
part of God’s messianic plan) and the ultra-orthodox (who seek enforcement of age-old 
                                                 
88 We use the variable of home demolition as a proxy for the Israeli practice of collective punishment.  
For a different empirical treatment of this variable, see, for example, David A. Jaeger and M. Daniele 
Paserman, “The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series No. 5320, October 2005, who use barriers 
to movement (regulation of border checkpoints) as a proxy. 
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rabbinic codes).”89  Both of these groups are pro-settlement, and both are a significant 
element in the Israeli voting population who tend to support conservative Israeli political 
parties such as the Likud Party.  Nonetheless, the Likud Party is not without opposition 
within Israel.  Among its more compelling challengers is the newly-created centrist 
Kadima Party, that is generally viewed as pragmatic by centrists, but too conciliatory by 
the Israeli right.  Since the beginning of the Second Intifada, the Israeli prime minister 
has changed four times making negotiations with the Palestinians difficult.90 
In the Occupied Territories, the fate of the Palestinian State does not solely lie 
with Israeli action, but also depends on how well HAMAS and Fatah, the two leading 
Palestinian political parties, are able and willing to cooperate with one another.  Fatah is 
composed of several secular nationalist Palestinian organizations and has generally 
controlled internal and external politics since the 1967 Six Day War with Israel.  Fatah’s 
political agenda is generally described as being more practical and fluid (than HAMAS’) 
but is hampered by internal corruption.  HAMAS, by contrast, is a hard line, Islamic, 
anti-Israeli organization whose 1987 charter called for the destruction of the Jewish state 
and has often been at odds with Fatah’s political agenda.  Currently, HAMAS controls 
the Gaza Strip and Fatah controls the West Bank.  HAMAS enjoys the support of Iran 
and Syria, while secular Arab governments such as Jordan and Egypt generally support 
Fatah.91  As long as the two sides remain divided, peace talks with the Israeli government 
remain pointless. 
On July 11, 2000, the Camp David Summit was supposed to finally broker a 
lasting peace between the Palestinians and Israelis.  Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat 
and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak met at Camp David along with President Bill 
Clinton and top members of the U.S. cabinet to negotiate a final status settlement.  
                                                 
89 International Crisis Group, “Israel’s Religious Right and the Question of Settlements,” Middle East 
Report No. 89, 20 July 2009, 1, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/89_israels
_religious_right_and_the_question_of_settlements.pdf (accessed on October 15, 2009). 
90 International Crisis Group, “Israel’s Religious Right,” 4. 
91 Rawhi Afaghani, “Mr. President, the intra-Palestinian dispute is an obstacle to peace”, Common 
Ground News Service, 11 June 2009, 
http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=25663&lan=en&sid=0&sp=0 (accessed on October, 
12, 2009). 
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Unfortunately, after hard-fought negotiations, both sides refused to budge on key issues 
(that centered on territory and right-of-return for Palestinian refugees).  While Arafat 
returned to the West Bank a hero for not conceding on Palestinian demands, Barak faced 
a no-confidence vote in the Knesset, that he barely survived.92   Fallout from the Camp 
David Summit, coupled with Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, helped to 
instigate the Second Intifada.  
The Camp David Summit set the stage for further negotiations at the Taba 
Summit in January 2001.93  Coincident to these talks, violence from the nascent Second 
Intifada was on the rise, Israel was one month away from voting in hard-line Likud Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon, and President Clinton was a lame duck president.  The new U.S. 
administration did not give the Taba Summit momentum, and Prime Minister Sharon 
pledged during his campaign to retaliate harshly to the recent spike in Palestinian 
violence.  Once elected, Sharon proclaimed the agreements reached during the Taba 
Summit irrelevant.94 
In March 2002, then-acting Saudi Regent Crown Prince Abdullah brought 
together leaders from Arab countries to try to resolve both the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict with one proposal.  The Arab Peace Summit in Beirut 
offered what amounted to a land-for-peace deal to the Israelis.  The night prior to the 
proposal’s announcement, a HAMAS suicide bomber attacked the Park Hotel in Netanya 
in what is known as the Passover Massacre.  Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres 
responded by stating Israel would be ready to negotiate when the Palestinians ceased 
terrorist acts against Israel, and thus ended any momentum of the Saudi peace initiative.95 
                                                 
92 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, “A History of the Arab Israeli Conflict”, 329–330. 
93 The Taba Summit was a hastily conceived summit hosted by Egypt in December 2000 through 
January 2001 with the idea of reaching a compromise between the Israeli and Palestinian red lines that 
arose during the Camp David Summit.  President Bill Clinton developed a series of compromise proposals 
including the splitting up of Jerusalem.  See, for example, Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, “A 
History of the Arab Israeli Conflict,” 277–278. 
94 Katie Rooney, “A timeline of the Peace Process,” Time Magazine Online Edition, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1644149_1644147_1644141,00.html (accessed on 
October 9, 2009).  
95 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 352. 
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The Road Map for Peace was written by the U.S. State Department based on a 
speech delivered by President Bush in 2002, outlining his policy toward the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  During June 2-4, 2002, with the backing of the Quartet (UN, EU, 
Russia, and the U.S.), President Bush met with representatives from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Bahrain, in addition to Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas.  The 
Roadmap called for a cessation of hostilities to allow for negotiations to begin and for the 
Quartet to monitor progress and stay engaged with the peace process.  Additionally, the 
Roadmap called for Palestinian statehood by 2005—contingent on Israeli and Palestinian 
sentiment.96 
The Geneva Accords, launched in December 2003, was an unofficial initiative to 
reach a settled agreement centered on establishment of a Palestinian state in most of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The Accords stipulated that Israel remove all settlements not 
in Israeli territory and give up equal land (adjacent to Gaza) in return for any lands Israel 
kept outside of the 1967 borders.   In return, the Palestinian Authority would recognize 
the State of Israel, cease all violence against Israel, and disarmed and disbanded all illegal 
armed groups.  Additionally, the plan specified Israel would give back most of its 
territory in return for the Palestinian Authority agreeing to restrict the right-of-return of 
Palestinian refugees to a predetermined number Israel would later dictate.  Both 
governments ultimately renounced the initiative.97 
After the death of Arafat in November 2004, and the subsequent election of 
Abbas, the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in February 2005 opened an opportunity for a 
negotiated truce between Sharon and Abbas.  Sharon made good on his promise to 
withdraw all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in the West Bank and halt home 
demolitions as retribution.  The Gaza disengagement plan was implemented in August 
2005, to the chagrin of Sharon’s right-wing political base, and set up confrontations 
between the IDF and Jewish settlers.  Abbas viewed the disengagement plan as a political 
                                                 
96 Sharon Otterman, “Middle East: Road Map to Peace,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7831/middle_east.html (accessed October 12, 2009). 
97 The Geneva Accord, Haaretz.com, 19 October 2003, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=351461&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbS
ubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y (accessed on October 15, 2009). 
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victory for the Palestinian Authority, but HAMAS claimed victory and further 
legitimized its armed resistance against Israel.  The Palestinian Electorate responded by 
voting 76 HAMAS candidates to the Palestinian Authority Legislature on January 26, 
2006, giving HAMAS a majority of the 136 seats available.98 
By the end of 2006, tensions were rising between the Fatah and HAMAS as living 
conditions deteriorated throughout the Occupied Territories.  Armed supporters of Fatah 
and HAMAS clashed repeatedly, and more than 100 Palestinians were killed in the 
violence. On February 8, 2007, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Fatah and HAMAS signed an 
agreement to form a Palestinian national unity government aimed at ending both the 
violence and the international aid embargo.99  The marriage was short lived, as the new 
government was unable to lift the economic embargo due to many ideological differences 
on how to proceed with peace negotiations.  Fighting broke out in May, and by June 
Fatah and HAMAS officially split—with HAMAS controlling the Gaza Strip and Fatah 
staying in power in the West Bank.  June 2007 saw the worse intra-Palestinian violence 
yet, as both sides jockeyed for control of their respective spans of control.  In total, 2007 
saw 353 Palestinians killed by other Palestinians, with 160 killed in June alone.100 
2. Israeli Incursions 
Israeli incursions into the Palestinian Occupied Territories continue to stoke 
resentment from the Arab world and are often a source of international criticism levied 
against the Israeli government. As a result, the IDF and the Israeli government have 
suffered a series of international rebukes with each subsequent incursion into the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories.101  The nature of the incursions is viewed as an affront 
                                                 
98 Scott Wilson, “Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast,” The 
Washington Post Online Edition, 27 January 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html# (accessed October 10, 2009). 
99 Scott Wilson, “Palestinian Legislators Approve Unity Cabinet: Hamas, Fatah Diverge in Policy 
Remarks,” The Washington Post Online Edition, March 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031700224.html (accessed October 12, 2009). 
100 B’Tselem, “Violations of the Human Rights of Palestinians by Palestinians,” 
http://www.btselem.org/English/Inter_Palestinian_Violations/ (accessed on October 12, 2009). 
101 Gal Luft, “The Palestinian H-Bomb: Terror’s Winning Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July-
August, 2002), 3-5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033234?seq=4 (accessed October 16, 2009). 
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to the dignity and sovereignty of the Palestinian people.  Furthermore, the incursions 
often bring a heavy handed military presence that further stokes the flames of animosity 
between the IDF and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. 
In March 2002, as a result of a rash of suicide attacks culminating with the 
Passover Massacre in which a Palestinian Suicide Bomber killed 29 Israelis in Netanya, 
Prime Minister Sharon launched Operation Defensive Shield in order to destroy the 
Terrorist infrastructure in the occupied territories.102  The Operation took place in major 
Palestinian population centers in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The results were 
mixed, while the Israelis announced the success of the operation, Palestinians, NGOs and 
the international press claimed that the IDF used excessive force and did not discriminate 
between combatant and non-combatants.103  
Operation Rainbow, conducted by the IDF from May 18-23, 2004, concentrated 
on the Palestinian city of Rafah and was intended to halt the flow of artillery, rockets, 
missiles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, assault rifles, and suicide belts through 
tunnels from Egypt directly to the Gaza Strip.104  Israeli troops destroyed several tunnels 
and met their tactical objective but when the IDF killed eight Palestinian protestors, the 
operation quickly turned into a media nightmare for the Israelis.105  As noted above, the 




                                                 
102 See the opening vignette in this chapter. 
103 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A History of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 352. 
104 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the Headlines: Rafah. Gateway to Terrorism”; 20 May, 
2004.  http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/5/Behind+the+Headlines+-
+Rafah+Gateway+to+terrorism.htm (accessed October 15, 2009). 
105 For the media backlash on Operation Rainbow, please see, for example, Human Rights Watch 
(http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11963/section/15) and Haaretz.com 
(http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/431683.html) that discuss the humanitarian impact of Operation 
Rainbow. 
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From June to August 2006, The IDF conducted Operation Summer Rain with 
stated goals of the return of recently abducted IDF solider Corporal Shalit and preventing 
the launching of Qassam rockets into Israel.106  In addition to Operation Summer Rain, 
Israel prosecuted the Second Lebanon War in July 2006.  Not wanting to open a second 
front in Northern Israel, for a variety of economic and tactical reasons, the Israelis’, 
“…restraint ended on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah terrorists attacked an Israeli patrol 
on the Israeli side of the border and abducted two soldiers.”107  The results of the Second 
Lebanon War are generally seen as an embarrassment to the IDF and Israel for their 
failure to properly assess the Hezbollah military threat (which stemmed from an 
underestimation of Israel’s enemy), as well as their failure to adequately source the IDF 
(as a result of the northern and southern fronts).108 
From December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, The IDF conducted Operation 
Cast Lead in an attempt to destroy HAMAS weapons, specifically rocket caches, and stop 
rocket and mortar barrages originating from the Gaza Strip.   B’Tselem interviewed 
several Palestinian groups in Gaza who had fired rockets into Israel and who admitted 
that their intentions were to kill Israeli civilians.  Regardless of HAMAS’ blatant 
disregard for International law, the Palestinians drew international sympathy from the 
Operation, while the Israelis were harshly condemned by human rights organizations for 
using excessive force and not doing enough to use force discriminately.  B’Tselem 
estimates the number of Palestinians killed during Operation Cast Lead was 1,387, of 
which only 330 were verified as taking part in hostilities.109 
                                                 
106 For a detailed recounting of Operation Summer Rain, see the reference articles as published by the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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3. Home Demolitions 
After the capture of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the 1967 Six Day 
War, “Israel has implemented a policy of demolishing and sealing houses in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip as a punitive measure against the Palestinian population.”110  Israel 
has used this method periodically and to varying degrees but initiated the program in 
earnest in October 2001, just over a year after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. 
The Israeli government states three reasons for destroying Palestinian homes: 
legality (homes built without permits), punishment, and security (military reasons).111  
Israel reintroduced punitive home demolitions in October 2001 to punish any Palestinian, 
including family and support systems, who either conducted or was involved in acts of 
violence against Israel citizens.  Home demolition for military purposes was conducted 
mainly in the Gaza Strip to ensure the security of Israeli settlements, when they were still 
there, or to clear security zones along the border with Egypt.112  We will explore the 
actual impact of this line of operation in the following section. 
In his book on the First Intifada, Brigadier General Ariyeh Shalev examined the 
effect of home demolitions on the scope of violence.  He found that the number of violent 
events did not diminish following house demolitions, and at times even rose.113  In 
another book, The Seventh War, the authors studied the effects of home demolitions 
during the Second Intifada.  While conducting research, the authors discovered an 
internal IDF report that “stated there was no proof of the deterrent effect of house 
demolitions, and that the number of attacks even rose a few months after implementation 
of the policy began.”114  These two statements are significant and are meant to clearly 
indicate the adverse effects home demolition have in preventing further instances of 
                                                 
110 B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “House 
Demolitions as Punishment,” http://www.btselem.org/english/Punitive_Demolitions/Index.asp (Accessed 
on October 14, 2009).  For the purposes of our thesis, we focus on the punishment and security 
implications—vice the legal aspects—of this policy. 
111 B’Tselem, “Statistics.” 
112 B’Tselem, “House Demolitions as Punishment.” 
113 Ariyeh Shalev as cited in B’Tselem, “House Demolitions as Punishment.” 
114 Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff as cited in B’Tselem, “House Demolitions as Punishment.” 
 65
Palestinian violence.  Table 5 shows the yearly aggregate number of home demolitions 






2001 10 (from October) 0 10
2002 251 0 251
2003 225 0 225
2004 177 1404 1581
2005 0 19 19
2006 0 316 316
2007 0 43 43
2008 0 141 (through June) 141  
Table 5.   Palestinian Homes Destroyed (2001-2008).115 
In February 2005, following the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, Defense Minister 
Shaul Mofaz put a halt to punitive home demolitions.116  One reason for the change in 
policy may have been the detrimental effects of the policy.  If so, that does not explain 
the continuation of the demolitions under the guise of security.  Another reason the 
demolitions continued may have been to give Fatah Leader and Palestinian Prime 
Minister Abbas political credibility against rival HAMAS.  As stated above, military 
home demolitions were conducted for security purposes.  In 2004, we see a spike in the 
aggregate numbers of homes destroyed for security (conducted by the IDF).  A closer 
look at the data shows that 511 homes were destroyed in May 2004, corresponding with 
Operation Rainbow in the Gaza Strip where the IDF was clearing security threats to 
further isolate HAMAS in an attempt to secure the Israeli border with Gaza. 
The three new variables introduced in this section—peace talks, Israeli incursions, 
and home demolitions—suggest both that the complexity and passions surrounding the 
Second Intifada are difficult to untangle and that these may have a significant impact on 
levels of Palestinian attacks.  The Israeli and Palestinian territorial claims have a 
                                                 
115 This table was built using data from B’Tselem’s complied statistics.  See B’Tselem, “Statistics.” 
116 B’Tselem, “House Demolitions as Punishment.” 
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significant influence on their choices of course of actions.  Similarly, IDF incursions into 
the Occupied Territories, perhaps loosely coupled with the demolition of homes, appear 
to alter the conditions that drive Palestinian attacks and Israeli responses.  In order to 
better unpack the full story, in the next section we attempt to measure the relative impact 
of these three variables in order to better understand to what degree each may drive 
Palestinian attack levels.  By operationalizing these variables, we hypothesize the model 
will lend additional explanatory value to the study variable that is the efficacy of targeted 
killing.  
D. ITERATION 5: ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNQUANTIFIABLE 
The previous section bridges the empirical analysis of Iterations 1–4 to this 
section that incorporates the three new variables discussed above.  From the analysis of 
the previous iterations of the model, we begin to incorporate the final set of variables that 
are not quantifiable, yet have significant impact on the environment in which the Second 
Intifada is fought.  Given these latest additions, our model takes the form: 
E(yPA│x) = exp(β0 + βTKxTK + βATFxATF + βDTxDT + βNTKxNTK + βTK-1xTK-1 + βPA-1xPA-1 + 
βSUMxSUM + βCY02xCY02 + βPTxPT + βINCxINC + βHDxHD + ε) 
where βHDxHD represents the addition of the dummied proxy variable home demolitions, 
βPTxPT represents the addition of the dummy variable for peace talks and βINCxINC 
represents the addition of the dummy variable for instances of major incursions.117 
Our hypothesis is that the factors discussed in the preceding section are influential 
in the levels of Palestinian attacks.  The introduction of these variables should produce a 
negative coefficient (i.e., do not promote Palestinian attacks) if, for example, peace talks 
stir hope, but would generate a positive coefficient (i.e., promote Palestinian attacks) if 
these variables were seen as provocative or as a betrayal by Palestinian observers.  Based 
 
                                                 
117 For “peace talks” and “incursions,” we simply coded these variables as being either present or 
absent during the monthly time scale used throughout this thesis.  For “home demolitions,” we used the 
empirical data from B’Tselem.  See B’Tselem, “Statictics.”  And as a reminder from our Data and Methods 
discussion earlier in this chapter, we used Stata 10’s ipolate function to linearly extrapolate to missing 
values on this variable. 
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on our earlier research, we expect to see a strongly positive coefficient in both the 
incursion and home demolition variables with a smaller negative coefficient for the peace 
talk variable. 
 68
Depent Variable:  Palestinian 
Attacks (resulting in Israeli 
deaths)
Iteration (1) Iteration (2) Iteration (3) Iteration (4) Iteration (5)
Targeted Killing .07909 .0710679 .0756638 .0898683 .0868433
(0.0296406)*** (.0351212)** (.0379115)** (.0376532)** (.0268772)***
Kilometers of Anti-Terrorism -.0481516 -.039109 -.0403573 -.0177135 -.0293878
Fence Completed (per 10 km) (.0137842)**** (.013887)*** (.0144412)*** (.0169507) (.0176429)*
Detainees (per 100 detainees) -.0059536 -.0082295 -.0108311 -.0226457 -.0170022
(.0063514) (.0065457) (.0070556)# (.0082659)*** (.0082231)**
Non-Targeted Killing .0088188 .0120916 .013895 .0109693
(.0060926)^ (.0059949)** (.0044081)*** (.0028118)****
Targeted Killing .0081596 .0254436 -.0102761
(lagged by 1 Month) (.02999) (.0301812) (.0359576)
Palestinian Attacks -.0476828 -.0836695 -.0833494







Israeli Incursions into .2497864
the Occupied Territories (.1383809)*
Palestinian Homes Destroyed -.0174572
(.0105139)*
Constant 1.775083 1.533947 1.742337 1.859897 1.864889
(0.1566742)**** (.2140839)**** (.2472228)**** (.2235774)**** (.1852892)****
Observations 98 98 98 98 98
Pseudo-Log Likelihood -157.80254 -154.29693 -152.60996 -148.18801 -145.50173
Pseudo R-squared 0.3789 0.3927 0.3993 0.4167 0.4273
BIC 333.945 331.5187 337.3147 337.6407 346.0231
AIC 323.6051 318.5939 319.2199 314.376 315.0035
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
****significant at .1%; ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level
^This value was .048 away from being significant at the 10% level
#This value was .025 away from being significant at the 10% level  
Table 6.   Analysis of the Baseline Model, Adding Non-Targeted Killing, Lagging Targeted 
Killing and Palestinian Attacks, Controlling for Summer and 2002, Adding Peace 
Talks, Incursions and Homes Destroyed. 
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In Table 6, the most surprising finding is the impact of the Israeli demolition of 
homes in the Occupied Territories.  Our hypothesis was rejected by the regression 
analysis results, as the outcome for the home demolitions variable was statistically 
significant, yet with a negative effect.  What would appear to be a highly provocative 
action by the Israelis appears to yield an impact on Palestinian attacks that is on par with 
arrests and just slightly less effective than construction of the Anti-Terrorist Fence.  This 
suggests that not only do home demolitions not lead to a subsequent increase in 
Palestinian attacks, this line of operation—that may be the only kinetic Israeli action to 
behave this way—appears to actually reduce follow-on levels of Palestinian attacks.118 
The impact of peace talks produced a statistically significant, highly positive 
coefficient.  Initially, this finding was also surprising given the purpose of the peace 
talks.  However, a review of the literature suggested that Palestinian subversion of the 
peace process should not be unanticipated, and in fact, extremists groups within the 
Occupied Territories have a history of disrupting (and destroying) Israeli-Palestinian 
peace negotiations via the purposeful instigation of violence.119   
Not surprisingly, Israeli incursions into the Occupied Territories produced a 
positive coefficient with statistical significance at the 10 percent level.  This line of 
operation, both in the results of our regression analysis and in our non-empirical research, 
produces a strong reaction from Palestinian groups and is highly correlated with 
increased levels of Palestinian attacks.  However, this finding may be clouded by 
suspected covariance with the non-targeted killing or targeted killing coefficients.  Thus, 
its predictive value may be less trustworthy than the empirical results alone suggest. 
Of note, the effect of the control variables of “summer” and “2002” declined 
slightly from the previous model, but this does not diminish the significance of the 
finding that the occurrence of peace talks and incursions appears to drive levels of 
                                                 
118 This finding should not be taken as an endorsement of these demolitions, but may provide insight 
into more effective ways to approach analogous situations.  For example, home demolitions reduced 
Palestinian attacks, but in the future perhaps a less kinetic form of upsetting enemy sanctuary may be 
employed to similar affect without resorting to such a draconian method for this disruption. 
119 See, for example, Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of 
Extremist Violence,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 263–296. 
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Palestinian attacks higher.  Furthermore, although the standard error for these dummy 
variables is relatively large, the impact is greater than any other variable except the 
control variables. 
The variable coefficient statistical significance has increased from the fourth 
model, and the standard errors have, on balance, reduced slightly with the introduction of 
the dummy and proxy variables, suggesting that this model may be slightly more 
adequate than that of previous iterations.  The BIC score is also the highest of all the 
iterations.  Furthermore, as noted in all previous iterations, the targeted killing coefficient 
remains positive, while the Anti-Terrorist Fence and detentions coefficients remain 
negative.  Overall, the fitness and constant scores for this model suggest it may not be as 
adequate as our earlier iterations, but it yields a more complete picture of the interactive 
and iterative nature of Palestinian-Israeli violence during the Second Intifada. 
E. GROUNDING THE RESULTS 
As we conclude this chapter, we present a somewhat different look at the data in 
an attempt to ground the above analysis in some kind of “real world” context.  While the 
iterative regression analysis we have thus far discussed is certainly useful and helps to 
illuminate whether Israel’s lines of operation are contributing to or detracting from the 
overall level of Palestinian attacks, some may consider the analysis too abstract or 
technical.120  In this section, we attempt to add a level of comprehensibility to the variety 
of values in the above tables.  The lens through which we have chosen to present this data 
is the percentage change in expected counts. 
In Table 6, we present the variables of our model in terms of the percent change 
in expected count for unit increase in X.  That is, as the count of each independent 
variable increases (or decreases) by one unit of measure (i.e., an episode of targeted 
                                                 
120 We recognize that regression analysis of this kind can have a fair number of critics.  With the 
mathematical modeling process, we (by design) attempt to simplify an otherwise complicated set of 
interrelated factors.  Charges that modeling provides a too-scripted, too-idiosyncratic, too-simplistic and/or 
too-predictive “recipe” for understanding complicated problems are well-understood.  While we recognize 
that simply “telling the story” may be a more approachable treatment, as we discussed in Chapter I, doing 
so does not address the interrelated nature of causal relationships among the variables. 
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killing, 10 kilometers of Anti-Terrorist Fence constructed, inter alia), the dependent 
variable is affected by a specific percent change.  
In Iteration 5 of our modeling process, with each episode increase in targeted 
killing, we can expect the level of Palestinian attacks to increase by 9.1 percent.  
Conversely, in the same iteration, Anti-Terrorist Fence completion carries a -2.9 percent 
change in expected count.  Thus, with each additional ten kilometers of Fence completed, 
we can expect the level of Palestinian attacks to decrease by 2.9 percent.   It is important 
to keep in mind that these results are based on the aggregated analysis of the data.  That 
is, while it may be true that targeted killing serves to increase Palestinian attack levels by 
9.1 percent, that increase is seen over the entirety of the dataset (October 2000-December 
2008).  Individual episodes of targeted killing will likely have different results, but over 
the breadth of the conflict, a 9.1 percent increase in Palestinian attacks is expected. 
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Depent Variable:  Palestinian 
Attacks (resulting in Israeli 
deaths)
Iteration (1) Iteration (2) Iteration (3) Iteration (4) Iteration (5)
Targeted Killing 8.2 7.4 7.9 9.4 9.1
Kilometers of Anti-Terrorism -4.7 -3.8 -4.0 -1.8 -2.9
Fence Completed (per 10 km)
Detainees (per 100 detainees) -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 -2.2 -1.7
Non-Targeted Killing 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.1
Targeted Killing 0.8 2.6 -1.0
(lagged by 1 Month)
Palestinian Attacks -4.7 -8.0 -8.0
(lagged by 1 Month)
Summer 35.0 29.0
2002 52.0 38.2
Palestinian Homes Destroyed -1.7
Peace Talks 29.6
Israeli Incursions into 28.4
the Occupied Territories  
Table 7.   Percent Change in Expected Count. 
When viewed in terms of the percentage change in expected count, the various 
lines of operation take on a bit more concrete meaning.  Rather than simply determining 
which independent variables are acting to reduce or increase the dependent variable, our 
model now begins to place relative weights of effort for each independent variable.   This 
is potentially illuminating when couched in terms of the decision making processes 
involved in deciding which and how much of various lines of operation fit within Israel’s 
overall strategy. 
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F. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD 
As we have argued throughout this thesis, the interrelated nature of the variables 
at work during the Second Intifada underscore the need to first untangle the operative 
variables to then derive the relative weights of effort within this system of violence.  This 
chapter’s opening vignette serves to reinforce our claim.  Unlike the more basic analyses 
in Chapter II, regression analysis proved to be a more useful tool with which to unpack 
Israeli’s various lines of operation.  Through this analysis we discerned which lines of 
operation actually contributed to or reduced the levels of Palestinian attacks against Israel 
(in the aggregate).  In all iterations, targeted killing was shown to actually contribute to 
an increase in Palestinian attacks.  Whereas other study variables, such as the Fence and 
detentions, were shown to significantly reduce these attacks. 
In the next chapter, we will take a step back from this detailed level of analysis 
and draw out those conclusions that are perhaps useful in a broader context.  We can now 
perhaps make the claim that Israel is better able to, at a minimum, conduct an informed 
cost-benefit analysis when employing its various lines of operation.  In other words, 
Israel can (and does) still choose to conduct targeted killing operations.  Current literature 
suggests this is done without understanding whether or why targeted killing is helping.  
We submit that Israel can now begin to discern that by conducting targeted killing 
operations, Palestinian attacks are likely to increase (in the aggregate).  However, that 
cost can be balanced against other potential benefits, such as increased Israeli morale or 
political clout in order to prosecute other, effective lines of operations.121 
In any event, this model begins to provide a framework for understanding of the 
relative efficacy of various lines of operation in Israel’s counterterrorism strategy—an 
understanding that has proven elusive in the current literature. 
 
 
                                                 
121 By “effective,” we simply reference those factors that were determined to have an overall reducing 
effect on the level of Palestinian attacks; e.g., construction of the Fence. 
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR 
TARGETED KILLING 
A. WHAT HAVE WE DONE? 
We began this thesis with the general premise that Israel’s program of targeted 
killing suffered from a lack of understanding concerning the effects and effectiveness of 
such a program.  The current literature made claims that were not fully supported.  Critics 
of the program offered evidence that the program was illegal, immoral or ineffective.  
Proponents of the program provided evidence to the contrary.  Ultimately, however, we 
claimed that the state of the current literature hinted at the complex and tangled reality of 
targeted killing efficacy—a reality that required further study. 
As we demonstrated in each analytic iteration of Chapter III, Israeli targeted 
killing operations during the Second Intifada were shown to be highly correlated, in a 
statistically significant way, with increased levels of Palestinian violence (in the 
aggregate).  And we draw this conclusion, not based on a simple analysis between two 
variables.  Rather, we draw this conclusion from the mathematical modeling of a host of 
other independent variables interacting with (or in concert with) targeted killing.  In so 
doing, we also determined the relative weights of effort for a number of Israel’s 
counterterrorism lines of operation.  We determined that construction of the Anti-
Terrorist Fence and an increase in Palestinian detentions, for example, work to reduce the 
overall level of Palestinian attacks.  Because of our modeling process, and the fact that 
we attempted to account for a range of factors impacting this system of violence, we feel 
more confident in our conclusions than perhaps previous treatments of this topic allow. 
So, do we now better understand the causal mechanisms involved in targeted 
killing?  We argue, yes.  Our modeling process, far from simply disproving a positive 
correlation between Israeli targeted killing and Palestinian attacks, demonstrated a 
statistically significant correlation between targeted killings and increased numbers of 
Palestinian attacks against Israel.  And we not only determined whether targeted killing 
“works” for Israel, but we also determined how Israel’s other lines of operation serve to 
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impact that system.  This thesis yields a better understanding of the dynamics inside this 
system of violence and what part targeted killing actually plays. 
B. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS? 
What does this all mean?  Is targeted killing, then, as bad as its critics claim?  
Should Israel (and other states prosecuting counterterrorism strategies) abandon a 
program of targeted killing?  Not necessarily.  While our analysis certainly does not help 
advocates of Israel’s targeted killing program, we believe perhaps the larger lesson to be 
drawn from our analysis rests in a state’s ability to make a better-informed decision vis-à-
vis its targeted killing program.  We readily admit that there is more going on in the 
Israeli case study than perhaps is being captured by our model.  That is, while we have 
demonstrated that targeted killing is not helping Israel achieve its stated strategic desired 
end state of reducing numbers of Palestinian attacks, perhaps it is the case that the effects 
of targeted killing may help facilitate pursuit of other Israeli interests.  For example, 
while national security is, at times, an all-consuming concern for Israel, and with all due 
deference to the perceived existential nature of the threat facing that state, reducing the 
level of Palestinian attacks is not the only national interest Israel faces on a recurring 
basis.  That is, Israel is not concerned just with its security.  Domestic and economic 
interests, national unity concerns, and the (re-)electability of Knesset members are but a 
few of Israel’s competing concerns. 
The point is that by knowing the effects of targeted killing operations, the national 
decision making establishment is presumably better able to understand the trade-offs of 
targeted killing vis-à-vis potential benefits in the other systems of which Israel is 
concerned.  We argue that Israel is now better situated to more accurately make the 
decision whether or not to employ targeted killing and when to do so.  Israel can now 






operations, knowing there is the potential for an increase in Palestinian attacks, but 
realizing that it may actually accrue benefits in other arenas—benefits that are worth the 
risk that targeted killing presents.122 
As we conclude this section, we want to address the claim that this case study and 
our resulting model are too idiosyncratic to be of use to other, novel cases.  While that 
may be true, we have taken care to generalize the ideas in this chapter to the point of 
being applicable to other state’s treatment of targeted killing.  At a minimum, if we have 
convincingly argued the importance of systematically thinking through the problem, 
linking the tactical to the strategic, we have succeeded.  While admittedly short of 
conclusively settling the debate between proponents and opponents of targeted killing, 
our proposed methodology provides precisely such a vehicle for the kind of systematic 
thinking that can illuminate clearer decision making vis-à-vis targeted killing. 
C. WHAT WE DID NOT DO: POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Though we explored the case of the Second Intifada in some detail, we must be 
clear that our thesis leaves some gaps.  Two areas remain for future research.  First, 
additional research and analysis for variables within the Second Intifada case were not 
examined in this case and may yield additional insight.  Second, we did not test our 
model against other cases outside the Second Intifada.  Either approach, we argue, may 
potentially provide further insight on this topic. 
Though the final iteration of our model captures many significant variables, we 
did not measure or capture all possible elements of the Israeli case.  Further research can 
explore within the case and develop a more robust model.  Within case research could 
center on either adding additional variables or focusing on more spatial or temporal 
aspects of analysis.  Additional variables that were considered, though not included, were 
the morale effect of targeted killing operations (for both Israeli and Palestinian groups), 
                                                 
122 By way of a minor example, perhaps targeted killing, while not shown to reduce Palestinian 
violence, actually affords the Israeli government the political cover to pursue construction of certain 
sections of the Anti-Terrorist Fence—an endeavor that receives a fair amount of criticism from within and 
without Israel and the Occupied Territories.  Here we cited the admittedly dated information that in 2001, 
nearly 90 percent of Israelis polled supported a program of targeted killing.  See Steven R. David, “Fatal 
Choices.” 1–26. 
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the political machinations of the Israeli Knesset election cycles, and the impact of 
“outside” actors or events on the system of violence in the Second Intifada.  Lastly, we 
took an admittedly Israeli-centric view of this problem.  There is analytic richness to add 
by including more variables associated with the Palestinian actors involved.  As part of 
this Palestinian-oriented analysis, future researchers may choose to focus on the impact 
of intra-Palestinian violence and intra-Palestinian group competition for popular support.  
Questions of the effects of such intra-group actions may lead to a further examination of 
what we termed the “wearing out” effect in Chapter III.  
Though we claim that our analysis of the Second Intifada is robust, we readily 
admit that we did not extend this analysis to test the model against other cases.  Out-of-
case tests are welcome, and examples of such potential test cases abound.  As mentioned 
in Chapter I, history offers numerous datasets with which to test our methodological 
procedure.123  Alternatively, contemporary U.S. cases seem particularly appropriate for 
in-depth analyses.  Current U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Operations Iraqi Freedom and 
Enduring Freedom would also make for robust test cases in terms of the effects 
generated.  Analyzing these effects within the model would, we argue, provide much 
needed insight into the employment of these sometimes controversial operations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
So, what is the problem with targeted killing?  The problem is not simply the legal 
and moral grounds for the policy.  The problem is also not simply the tactical 
implementation of the policy.  Rather, the problem is that current research has not been 
able to convincingly articulate the effects of implementing a targeted killing program—
legally justified or not.  Is targeted killing useful?  This seems like a simple question, one 
however, that upon examination is quite complex.  It is this complexity that has unraveled 
previous attempts to understand the efficacy of targeted killing. 
                                                 
123 We have explored preliminary research in the case of the United States’ Phoenix Program in the 
Vietnam War.  Such a case makes for a nice comparison though not a perfect fit, as the U.S. was 
prosecuting a war “by, with and through” the South Vietnam government.  Regardless of the specific inter-
case variations, the lines of operation in the Phoenix Program are similar to those used by Israel during the 
Second Intifada.   
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This thesis examined Israel’s use of targeted killing during the Second Intifada to 
untangle the complexity of the causal relationships involved.  We simplified the complex 
reality via the use of a robust analytic process of mathematical modeling, accounting for 
a variety of factors influencing the system of violence.  We embedded our resulting 
model in a useable framework that can enable decision makers to make better informed 
decisions regarding the associated costs and benefits of employing a program of targeted 
killing.  Regardless of the analytic outcome, we believe the development and application 
of our methodological process may be more important than simply concluding whether 
targeted killing is useful or not. 
While our analysis indicates targeted killing is ineffective in the Israeli case study 
(vis-à-vis that country’s stated strategic desired end state), we leave it to future 
researchers to test our model against other cases to determine a more broad applicability 
of our methodology.  Future tests may determine that targeted killing was effective in 
certain cases.  Therefore, we suggest future applications of such a model and 
methodology are critical to both understanding the effects of such a program, as well as 
drawing more universal conclusions on the efficacy of targeted killing. 
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